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WHERE ANGELS TREAD: GUN-FREE SCHOOL 
ZONE LAWS AND AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO 
BEAR ARMS 
In separate opinions issued in 2008 and 2010, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
guarantees an individual right to bear arms.  For as lengthy as those 
opinions were, however, the justices only briefly dealt with possible limits 
to that right. Both decisions provided that their holding would not 
invalidate “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” 
This Comment argues that the uncertainty about the scope of the 
Second Amendment right has hardly been tempered by the Court’s 
limiting language and that federal and state laws criminalizing the 
possession of loaded handguns within 1000 feet of schools might be in 
danger.  The Comment further argues that the utility of gun-free school 
zone laws has been hampered and that lawmakers should consider 
necessary changes in light of potential legal challenges as well as recent 
legislative actions.  These recommended changes would penalize the 
discharge but not the possession of a handgun within 1000 feet of schools, 
while they would also eliminate the requirement in current statutes that the 
individual know that he is within a school zone before punishment can be 
meted out. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over nine inexplicable months in 1988 and 1989, disturbed adults 
armed with a various array of firearms entered schoolyards in three 
states spanning from one coast to the other and opened fire.1  In their 
wake, the incidents left eight elementary students dead and forty-three 
people wounded and spawned a raft of unprecedented gun-control 
measures throughout a shocked nation.2  Among the new laws adopted 
in the first half of the 1990s were the federal Gun-Free School Zones 
Act of 1990, which established a 1000-foot perimeter around school 
grounds in which it is illegal to carry a loaded weapon (barring certain 
exceptions),3 and similar statutes that are still in place in California4 and 
Illinois.5  In introducing legislation to create the federal law, U.S. 
Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin pointed to the need to combat the 
“growing problem . . . [of t]he proliferation of firearms in our schools.”6  
Senator Kohl cited the cases of Laurie Dann, who killed one eight-year-
old boy and wounded five other children at a Winnetka, Illinois 
elementary school in May 1988,7 and Patrick Purdy, who sprayed a 
Stockton, California elementary school playground with bullets, killing 
 
1. See Elsa Walsh, Heavy Legislative Fire Aims at Gun Sale Curbs: Schoolyard Shootings 
Alarm Lawmakers, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1989, at D1. 
2. See id. 
3. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 § 1702(b)(2)(25), 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(25), 922(q) 
(2006).  This Comment involves the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and its 1996 
amendments as opposed to the similarly named Gun-Free Schools Act, which requires states 
receiving federal education funds to pass laws mandating the expulsion of students in 
possession of firearms on school grounds.  See 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2006). 
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011). 
5. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(1)–(1.5) (West 2010). 
6. 136 CONG. REC. 1165 (1990) (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl). 
7. See id.; Lisa Black & Bonnie Miller Rubin, Unshakeable Anguish: Old Wounds and 
New Paths Emerge for 3 Two Decades After Dann Shooting Rampage, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 
2008, § 2, at 1. 
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five children and wounding thirty others in January 1998.8  Kohl added 
to the record, 
 
My home State, Wisconsin, is not immune from this wave of 
gun violence.  Last year, the Milwaukee school system expelled 
more than a dozen students for weapons violations.  And the 
number of Milwaukee County juveniles charged with handgun 
possession has doubled over the past 2 years.  According to 
Gerald Mourning, the director of school safety for Milwaukee, 
“[K]ids who did their fighting with their fists, and perhaps 
knives, are now settling their arguments with guns.”9 
 
Today, a little more than two decades later, these gun-control efforts 
are coming under increased pressure after the Supreme Court’s recent 
rulings declared that the Second Amendment protects an individual 
right to bear arms.10  This battle is occurring not only in courts but in 
statehouses around the nation.  For example, within a couple of years of 
the Court’s decisions, Louisiana and Wisconsin replaced their gun-free 
school zone laws with more permissive versions.11 
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s famous and 
often-confusing words provide as follows: “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”12  For years, these clauses 
were interpreted by courts and legal scholars as preventing federal 
interference with the states’ abilities to support militias.13  Only in recent 
decades has the protection of an individual right become a matter of 
debate.14  The Court finally resolved this issue on June 26, 2008, with its 
 
8. See 136 CONG. REC. 1, 1165; Walsh, supra note 1. 
9. 136 CONG. REC. 1165 (alteration in original). 
10. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010); District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (noting, however, that Second Amendment should not be 
read “to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation”). 
11. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2 (2004 & Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. § 948.605 
(2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 35, §§ 91–96. 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); United States v. Cole, 276 
F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that courts had interpreted the Second 
Amendment as protecting a collective right “associated with the maintenance of a regulated 
militia” for the previous six decades); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second 
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 640 (1989). 
14. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 13, at 640–42; Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace 
Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 801, 810 (1998). 
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opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, where a 5–4 majority held that 
the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to have a loaded 
handgun for self-defense.15  Two years and two days later, the Court 
extended the Heller Court’s holding in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
ruling that the Second Amendment right to bear arms applies to the 
states, thus limiting the ability of states and municipalities to regulate 
firearm possession.16  But, despite the lengthy opinions issued in each 
case, the Court left open many issues that relate to the constitutionality 
of numerous gun-control laws.  As Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, complained, “The Court has invited 
future [Second Amendment] challenges by not defining the scope of the 
right to bear arms, by not providing a standard of review for firearms 
regulation, and by creating a list of exceptions to the newfound personal 
Second Amendment right.”17 
 
 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Emerson provides a 
comprehensive round-up of the state of the law at the time of its 2001 decision.  According to 
the majority, 
 
In the last few decades, courts and commentators have offered what may 
fairly be characterized as three different basic interpretations of the Second 
Amendment.  The first is that the Second Amendment does not apply to 
individuals; rather, it merely recognizes the right of a state to arm its militia.  
This “states’ rights” or “collective rights” interpretation of the Second 
Amendment has been embraced by several of our sister circuits. . . . 
Proponents of the next model admit that the Second Amendment 
recognizes some limited species of individual right.  However, this supposedly 
“individual” right to bear arms can only be exercised by members of a 
functioning, organized state militia who bear the arms while and as a part of 
actively participating in the organized militia’s activities.  The “individual” 
right to keep arms only applies to members of such a militia, and then only if 
the federal and state governments fail to provide the firearms necessary for 
such militia service. . . . 
The third model is simply that the Second Amendment recognizes the 
right of individuals to keep and bear arms. . . .  The individual rights view has 
enjoyed considerable academic endorsement, especially in the last two 
decades. 
270 F.3d 203, 218–20 (5th Cir. 2001).  In the end, the Emerson court found the last argument 
the most persuasive (supporting an individual right to bear arms) but held that the law 
challenged in this case did not unconstitutionally infringe upon this right.  Id. at 261. 
15. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
16. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. 
17. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 253, 280 (2009).  Judge Wilkinson III noted that “[t]he cases filed since Heller and the 
multitude of federal, state, and municipal gun control regulations threaten to suck the courts 
into a quagmire.”  Id. 
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In sidestepping such issues, the Court has practically invited a flood 
of litigation18 by politically connected and motivated parties on both 
sides of the gun-control issue.19  Indeed, on the same day as the 
McDonald decision, an interest group filed a lawsuit challenging a North 
Carolina law that forbids the carrying of firearms off of one’s property 
during a declared state of emergency.20  Dick Heller, the same plaintiff 
from the District of Columbia v. Heller case decided by the Court in 
2008, filed a new lawsuit challenging the statute adopted by the District 
of Columbia in response to the municipality’s loss before the Court.21  
Similarly, Chicago’s new ordinance was challenged in federal court 
shortly after the city council voted for its adoption.22  A wide-ranging set 
of lawsuits elsewhere have sought to overturn other gun-control laws 
including a Texas law that restricts the issuance of permits for the 
concealed carrying of handguns to individuals at least twenty-one years 
of age,23 a Maryland law that allows firearm permits only for people with 
a “good and substantial reason” to carry a handgun,24 a Georgia law 
 
18. See Kristin Myles et al., Supreme Court Watch: Guns, Incorporated, S.F. ATT’Y, Fall 
2010, at 48, 51 (describing McDonald’s legacy as “much more litigation”); Wilkinson, supra 
note 17, at 288 (predicting that “now . . . the litigation will take off”). 
19. See Wilkinson, supra note 17, at 301 (noting that the National Rifle Association has 
over four million members, and, on the opposing side, the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence 
brings together many organizations nationwide such as child welfare advocates, religious 
associations, and public health professionals). 
20. See Complaint at 2, 7–8, Bateman v. Perdue, No. 5:10-cv-265-H (E.D.N.C. June 28, 
2010); Cheryl Corley, Gun Activists to Challenge Local Gun Laws, NPR (July 1, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128240691. 
21. See Del Quentin Wilber & Paul Duggan, D.C. Is Sued Again over Handgun Rules, 
WASH. POST, July 29, 2008, at B1.  The lawsuit seeks to toss out many of the new 
requirements and also challenges a long-existing ban on machine guns, which includes most 
types of semiautomatic pistols.  Id. 
22. See Myles et al., supra note 18, at 51.  The new ordinance includes strict guidelines 
on who can apply for a permit, prohibits gun shops within city limits, confines the possession 
of loaded firearms to the home, and requires handgun owners to have both city permits and 
state firearms identification cards.  See Mark Guarino, Chicago Passes Revised Gun Law, 
Allowing Handgun Ownership, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 2, 2010), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2010/0702/Chicago-passes-revised-gun-law-allowing-
handgun-ownership. 
23. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172(a)(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); Matt 
Hamilton, Two 18 Year Olds Challenge Gun Laws, CONNECTAMARILLO.COM (Nov. 28, 
2010), http://www.connectamarillo.com/news/story.aspx?id=547076. 
24. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003); Complaint 
at 6, Woollard v. Sheridan, No. JFM-10-20668 (D. Md. Dec. 29, 2010); Maria Glod, Gun 
Rights Advocates Take Aim at Md. Limits: Federal Suit Challenges State’s Restrictions on 
Handgun Carry Permits, WASH. POST, July 30, 2010, at B6. 
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banning handguns in churches,25 and gun-free school zone (school zone) 
laws.26 
These last challenges—to the statutes that establish a 1000-foot 
firearm-free perimeter around schools—are the focus of this Comment.  
Because the constitutionality of such laws has been challenged before 
(albeit on different grounds)27 and the issue remains a visceral one for 
citizens struggling with a solution to school violence,28 a methodical 
exploration of this issue is necessary.  Part II.A of this Comment will 
discuss the state of Second Amendment jurisprudence established by 
the Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald.  Part II.B will examine 
how courts have dealt with challenges to gun-control laws in the shadow 
of those decisions.  Part III will evaluate possible judicial interpretations 
of the Second Amendment using the evolution of First Amendment 
interpretation as a model.  Part IV dissects how courts could evaluate 
the school zone laws by analyzing whether such laws infringe upon a 
protected right and balancing this possible infringement using the 
different levels of scrutiny that could determine the laws’ 
constitutionality.  Part V recommends solutions that legislatures in 
California and Illinois, as well as the United States Congress, can 
explore to avoid the possibility that their school zone laws could be 
voided as unconstitutional and to strengthen the utility of those laws.  
The solutions recommended in this Comment also can be considered by 
other states that have abandoned the restrictions in school zones in 
recent years due to legal concerns.  In fact, states with some of the most 
permissive gun laws that allow citizens to carry loaded firearms without 
 
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b)(4) (2006); see also Rhonda Cook, Suit Aims to Lift 
Ban on Guns in Church, ATLANTA J.–CONST., July 10, 2010, at B1.  A district court dismissed 
this challenge finding that, while possessing a firearm in a place of worship was protected by 
the Second Amendment, the restriction was substantially related to an important 
governmental interest.  GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1319 (M.D. 
Ga. 2011). 
26. Complaint at 3, Hall v. Garcia, No. CV10-3799 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011); Amended 
Complaint at 11–12, Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, No. 2:10-CV-9-CNC (E.D. 
Wis. Feb. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Wisconsin Carry Complaint]; see also Bruce Vielmetti, Gun 
Group Sues over Restriction, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 2010, at 3B; Matt Smith, Man 
Sues for Right to Carry Gun near Cole Valley’s Grattan School, S.F. WKLY. BLOGS (Aug. 27, 
2010, 2:10 PM), http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2010/08/gun_open_ carry_school.php. 
27. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–68 (1995) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) 
invalid as beyond Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause). 
28. See, e.g., Carl W. Chamberlin, Johnny Can’t Read ‘Cause Jane’s Got a Gun: The 
Effects of Guns in Schools and Options After Lopez, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 287–
88 (1999) (contending that firearms have “increased both the incidence and lethality of school 
violence”). 
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a state-issued license might want to reconsider their stance given the 
possible conflict that such laws create with the once nearly defunct 
federal Gun-Free School Zones Act.29 
II.  THE STATE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND THE COURTS 
AFTER HELLER AND MCDONALD 
For nearly seventy years leading into the twenty-first century and the 
Heller decision, the contemporary view held by the Supreme Court was 
that the Second Amendment protected the right to keep and possess a 
weapon only insofar as the weapon bore “some reasonable relationship 
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”30  In United 
States v. Miller, the most recent pre-Heller case to consider the issue, the 
Court in 1939 upheld a law prohibiting possession of an unregistered 
sawed-off shotgun in violation of the National Firearms Act.31  Rejecting 
the defendants’ argument that the regulation violated their Second 
Amendment right to bear arms, the Court concluded that the 
Constitution does not guarantee a right to carry such a weapon.32  As 
such, the Court interpreted the right’s protection as extending to the 
“obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the 
 
29. See State Firearms Laws Are Taking a Radical, Dangerous Turn, USA TODAY, Apr. 
25, 2011, at 8A (reporting that Wyoming became the fourth state, joining Alaska, Arizona, 
and Vermont, to allow citizens to carry firearms without licenses).  Because the federal law 
exempts persons carrying weapons in school zones who have been issued licenses by their 
states, it follows that residents in these states will be less likely to have permits and, therefore, 
may be more likely to commit felonies by traveling in school zones with their loaded firearms.  
See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 921(q)(1) (2006); Bruce Vielmetti, Gun 
Charge Against Sheboygan Falls Man Dismissed Again: Bicyclist Carried Firearms Within 
1,000 Feet of School, JSONLINE (June 17, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/ 
96625354.html; marktwain, Sheboygan Falls Open Carry GFSZ Case (Personal Account by 
Matthew Hubing), FREEREPUBLIC.ORG (June 19, 2010, 4:06 PM), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2538149/posts [hereinafter Personal Account of 
Matthew Hubing]. 
30. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).  Prior to 2008, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided three cases addressing the Second Amendment, each time holding that it 
granted only a “collective right” to an armed militia as opposed to an “individual right” to 
keep and bear arms.  See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment 
Scholarship: A Primer, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 1, 1 (Carl T. 
Bogus ed., 2000).  The push for an “individual rights” view of the Second Amendment among 
scholars was launched with a student article in 1960, building over the next few decades and 
attracting adherents even among law professors considered liberal and, therefore, assumed to 
be inclined against such an interpretation.  Id. at 1–13. 
31. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, 183. 
32. Id. at 178. 
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effectiveness of [militia] forces.”33  In addition, among federal appellate 
courts, between the Miller and Heller decisions only the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recognized that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual’s right to bear arms, although the court also upheld a 
challenged law encroaching upon this right.34 
A.  Heller and McDonald and the Changing Second Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
The Court’s prevailing view, established in Miller, that the Second 
Amendment only protects a collective right to bear arms, changed with 
the Court’s decision in Heller.35  In the landmark 2008 decision, the 
Court found that the Second Amendment protected an individual’s right 
to bear arms, rendering unconstitutional a District of Columbia 
ordinance that had the effect of prohibiting the possession of handguns 
or other firearms in readily-operable condition in private homes.36  The 
case concerned an ordinance prohibiting individuals from carrying 
unregistered firearms, while simultaneously prohibiting the registration 
of handguns within the nation’s capital.37  The ordinance also required 
residents to keep their registered firearms unloaded and inoperable—
either disassembled or trigger-locked—unless located in a place of 
business or used for lawful recreational activities.38  The plaintiff, Dick 
Heller, a special police officer at the Federal Judicial Center, filed his 
lawsuit challenging the ordinance after he applied for and was denied 
registration for a handgun in his home.39  The Court determined that the 
ordinance had the effect of barring the possession of a handgun in the 
home in a state that would allow it to be readily used for an individual’s 
self-defense, an effect that the majority determined was a violation of 
the Second Amendment’s protection of an individual’s right to keep and 
bear arms.40 
With McDonald v. City of Chicago in 2010, the Court found that the 
 
33. Id. 
34. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001); Adam Winkler, 
Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 691 (2007). 
35. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591 (2008). 
36. See id. at 635. 
37. See id. at 574–75 (citing D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) 
(2001)). 
38. See id. at 575 (citing D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02). 
39. Id. at 575. 
40. Id. at 628–29. 
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Second Amendment was enforceable against the states, thus 
invalidating ordinances in the Illinois municipalities of Chicago and Oak 
Park that had the effect of preventing residents from possessing 
handguns.41  In that case, the Chicago ordinance prohibited the 
possession of unregistered firearms and prohibited registration of most 
handguns by most residents.42  The Oak Park municipal code made it 
illegal for individuals to possess “pistols, revolvers, guns and small arms 
. . . commonly known as handguns.”43  Several of the plaintiffs in 
McDonald contended that they had been targeted by threats of violence 
and wished to possess handguns in their homes for self-defense but were 
prevented from doing so by the ordinances.44  The bulk of the Court’s 
decision in McDonald centered not on whether an individual right to 
possess a handgun in the home for self-defense was protected by the 
Second Amendment,45 which it already had established in Heller,46 but 
whether the protection of this right under the Second Amendment 
could be extended to the states and their subsidiaries (which a plurality 
found an affirmative basis in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).47 
The Court failed to define the scope of this Second Amendment 
right, however, beyond the facts posed by the restrictive ordinances 
considered in Heller and McDonald.48  In an opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia, the Court stated that “since this case represents this Court’s first 
in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect 
it to clarify the entire field.”49  Other than ruling out the use of a 
permissive type of interest balancing, the Court declined to identify a 
specific standard of review to be used by courts in evaluating the 
 
41. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). 
42. Id. at 3026; CHI. MUN. CODE §§ 8-20-040(a), 8-20-050(c) (2009). 
43. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (quoting OAK PARK, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 27-2-1 
(2007), 27-1-1 (2009)). 
44. Id. at 3026–27. 
45. See id. at 3026. 
46. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
47. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.  Justice Thomas argued in a concurring opinion 
that the Second Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.  See id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
48. See id. at 3026 (detailing the challenged ordinances in Chicago and Oak Park); 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629, 635 (2008).  In the majority opinion for 
Heller, Justice Scalia identified the District of Columbia’s handgun ban as one of the most 
restrictive laws in the nation’s history.  Id. 
49. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
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constitutionality of other firearm restrictions.50  In addition, although 
probably trying to head off potential challenges, the majority appears to 
have confused matters further by proffering a non-exhaustive list of laws 
that would withstand judicial scrutiny.51  In dicta,52 the Court wrote, 
 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms 
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial 
sale of arms.53 
 
The Court did not provide a clear rationale for its choices of permitted 
laws.54 
In McDonald, the Court failed to elaborate on what has been called 
“Heller’s asterisk.”55  Instead, a plurality of the Court “repeat[ed] those 
assurances” that the listed laws would not be in jeopardy, adding 
“incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”56  The 
McDonald Court also quoted thirty-eight state amici supporting the 
challenge to the Chicago and Oak Park ordinances: “[S]tate and local 
experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue 
under the Second Amendment.”57  Muddying its efforts to pacify the 
 
50. See id. at 634–35. 
51. Id. at 626–27, 627 n.26. 
52. “Dictum,” the singular form of the word “dicta,” is defined as “[a] statement of 
opinion or belief considered authoritative because of the dignity of the person making it.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (9th ed. 2009).  Thus, although “dicta” can be considered a 
pejorative and outside of a court’s holding, by definition it carries with it a certain weight of 
authority.  As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, “Supreme Court dicta controls 
when it is on point and it is the only available authority.”  See United States v. Chester, 367 F. 
App’x 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2010).  Such dicta has been described as nearly as binding as the 
Court’s holdings.  See Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996).  
Furthermore, the Heller Court’s dicta has been described as “dicta of the strongest sort.”  See 
Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller 
and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1372 (2009). 
53. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
54. See id. at 635 (acknowledging that “there will be time enough to expound upon the 
historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions 
come before us”). 
55. See Miguel E. Larios, To Heller and Back: Why Many Second Amendment Questions 
Remain Unanswered After United States v. Hayes, FED. LAW., Sept. 2009, at 58, 60. 
56. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010). 
57. Id. at 3046 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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fears of local officials, however, the Court in McDonald acknowledged 
that protections against state infringement of constitutional rights can 
differ from protections for federal infringement58 and that its decision 
“will to some extent limit the legislative freedom of the [s]tates.”59  Thus, 
with its opinion in McDonald, the Court ignored judges who had been 
practically begging for a clearer standard upon which to evaluate the 
constitutionality of gun-control regulations.60 
B.  Court Decisions After Heller and McDonald 
Commentators and courts have cited the lack of guidance provided 
in the Heller and McDonald decisions for prompting numerous legal 
challenges to come.61  Such was the argument made by Justice Stevens in 
his dissent to Heller where he criticized the Court’s majority for leaving 
a “formidable task” to future courts and questioned whether it would 
substantially increase the caseload of federal judges.62 
In the wake of Heller and McDonald, challenges to gun-control laws 
have been rife in federal courts, even when the implicated laws were 
explicitly supported by the language in the cases’ dicta.  The most 
common challenges in the immediate aftermath have been brought by 
felons contesting prohibitions on their possession of firearms by 18 
 
58. Id. at 3032.  Justice Stevens reiterated this idea in his dissent, arguing that “[t]he 
rights protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause need not be identical in shape or scope to the rights protected against Federal 
Government infringement by the various provisions of the Bill of Rights.”  Id. at 3093 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Stevens later suggested that “[s]o long as the regulatory measures 
they have chosen are not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable’ we should be allowing 
[states] to ‘try novel social and economic’ policies.”  Id. at 3114 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. at 3050. 
60. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 742 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (noting 
that the Heller Court “declined to announce the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny 
for review of the firearms restriction at issue in that case”); United States v. Staten, No. 09-
CR-00235, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91653, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 2, 2010) (blaming 
uncertainty by courts in evaluating subsequent Second Amendment cases on “the absence of 
direct guidance” and  “what some view as a categorical carve out for certain firearm 
regulations” provided by the Court in Heller); Warden v. Nickels, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228 
(W.D. Wash. 2010) (noting the “limited guidance as to how to evaluate the constitutionality 
of gun regulations under the Second Amendment” provided by Heller); United States v. 
Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787 (E.D. Va. 2009) (pointing out that the Heller decision 
“does not squarely address or decide the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to statutes 
and regulations subject to Second Amendment challenges”). 
61. See Myles, supra note 18, at 51; Wilkinson, supra note 17, at 280, 288 (predicting 
after Heller, but before the McDonald decision, that “the litigation will take off” due to the 
many questions left open by the Heller opinion). 
62. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 679–80 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).63  Ten circuits, as well as a number of district courts, 
have thus far upheld the statute against such challenges.64  Three of 
these circuits held that the presumption favoring gun controls on felons 
is not dicta but rather a condition that is part of the individual right to 
bear arms and, therefore, “the Supreme Court’s discussion in Heller of 
the categorical exceptions to the Second Amendment was not abstract 
and hypothetical; it was outcome-determinative.”65  Similarly, at least 
one district court has rejected a challenge to the federal Gun-Free 
School Zones Act based on the same language in Heller.66  Courts’ 
deference to lawmakers in these and other decisions has resulted in an 
expansion of the Court-given exceptions,67 sometimes without applying 
the historical analysis that the Court seemed to favor.68 
In considering what the Court meant in establishing its exceptions to 
the Second Amendment right for individuals to bear arms, some courts 
have examined the general ideas that those exceptions seem to support 
and have applied those general ideas to the circumstances presented by 
individual cases.69  Such a reading led a Washington district judge to 
 
63. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower 
Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1248 (2008–2009). 
64. See United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th 
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 805 (2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 
(9th Cir. 2010); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010); United States v. Stuckey, 317 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2814 (2009); 
United States v. Frazier, 314 F. App’x 801, 807 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Brunson, 292 
F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Irish, 285 F. App’x 326, 327 (8th Cir. 2008); 
Denning & Reynolds, supra note 63, at 1248–49 & nn.23–25.  But cf. Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 
320, 323 (N.C. 2009) (finding a state law prohibiting a felon from possessing a firearm violated 
the state’s constitutional protection of an individual right to bear arms as applied to a 
nonviolent offender whose civil rights had been restored to him). 
65. Barton, 633 F.3d at 172; see also Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.6; Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 
1115. 
66. See United States v. Lewis, 50 V.I. 995, 1000–01 (D.V.I. 2008). 
67. See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 63, at 1248. 
68. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (“Where a challenged statute apparently falls into one of the categories 
signaled by the Supreme Court as constitutional, courts have relied on the ‘presumptively 
lawful’ language to uphold laws in relatively summary fashion.”).  Not only did the Court 
undertake its own historical review in Heller, it also used the qualifier “longstanding” in 
defining the types of gun-control laws and regulations it deemed constitutional.  See District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605–26 (2008); Recent Case, United States v. Bledsoe, 
No. SA-08-CR-13(2), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60522 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2008), 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 827, 831–32 (2008) [hereinafter Texas Upholds Gun Regulation]. 
69. See, e.g., Warden v. Nickels, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1229 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
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deem that banning guns in parks fell within the Court’s exceptions for 
laws prohibiting possession of firearms in “sensitive places.”70  The court 
determined that “[a]s with a government building or a school, a city-
owned park where children and youth recreate is a ‘sensitive’ place 
where it is permissible to ban possession of firearms.”71 
Such broadly drawn interpretations of Heller’s exceptions are often 
coupled with a narrow construction of the decision’s central holding.72  
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, found the majority’s holding restrained to 
“the right ‘to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.’”73  
The majority itself seemed to limit even further the application of the 
Second Amendment right to only weapons “in common use at the time” 
of the amendment’s ratification,74 in certain confrontations,75 as well as 
for certain manners and purposes.76  The manners and purposes of this 
constitutional right are without much elaboration in the opinion, 
although self-defense (or “immediate self-defense”)77 is unquestionably 
protected.78 
The caution by lower courts to not overturn existing legislation could 
be the result of confusion over which standard of review to apply when 
evaluating the constitutionality of gun-control laws—a quandary that 
Justice Breyer predicted when Heller was decided.79  The majority ruled 
out tests that would ask whether a law burdens a protected interest 
disproportionately to other important government interests80 or whether 
a law is justified by advancing a “legitimate state interest.”81  But, the 
majority did not leave many more breadcrumbs as to which standard of 
 
70. See id. 
71. Id. 
72. See United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787–88 (E.D. Va. 2009) 
(stating that “Heller’s dicta is notable for the degree to which it confirms the limited scope of 
the case’s holding”). 
73. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 646 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting the majority). 
74. Id. at 627. 
75. See id. at 595 (“[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of 
citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.”). 
76. See id. at 626 (citing early treatises and cases finding that the Second Amendment 
right “was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever 
and for whatever purpose”). 
77. Id. at 635. 
78. See id. at 628–29. 
79. See id. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
80. See id. at 634–35.   
81. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 699–700. 
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review would be appropriate.  Although Justice Scalia rejected the 
application of interest balancing for laws that would restrict an 
individual’s Second Amendment rights,82 the language of Heller raises 
questions about whether he meant to exclude all forms of interest 
balancing or simply the limited form that he attributed to Justice 
Breyer’s dissent.83  In fact, Justice Scalia suggested that Justice Breyer’s 
form of interest balancing for Second Amendment rights would not 
meet the requirements for the strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or 
rational-basis tests.84  Therefore, by explicitly denying the application of 
only the novel interest-balancing approach and rational-basis test, the 
Court left open whether it intended other forms of interest balancing to 
be used to evaluate laws or whether it favored a categorical approach.85 
As a result, lower courts have used strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, and an undue burden-type test in evaluating whether laws 
violate the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.86  Under 
strict scrutiny, a law would have to be shown to serve a compelling 
government interest and also be narrowly tailored to serve that interest 
to be found constitutional.87  Intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, 
requires the government to show a “substantial relationship” between 
its restriction on a constitutional right and an “important” government 
objective.88  Both of those tests are more common than the undue-
burden test, which is largely confined to analyzing laws restricting 
abortion rights.89  Under the undue burden test, introduced by the 
Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a law runs afoul of the 
Constitution when it poses an undue burden on an individual’s ability to 
exercise a recognized right.90 
Commentators also have recommended “a deferential 
reasonableness” balancing test, in which nearly any regulation that does 
 
82. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35. 
83. Id. at 634.  
84. See id. at 634–35. 
85. See id. at 635 (identifying, without explicit clarity, some categorical carve-outs of 
individuals’ Second Amendment rights but not identifying this approach as the governing 
test).  For a more thorough discussion, see infra notes 125–41 and accompanying text. 
86. United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
87. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997). 
88. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 671 
(3d ed. 2006). 
89. See Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About 
Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1437 (2009). 
90. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
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not amount to an outright ban could be supported by the government’s 
“compelling interest,”91 or a “deferential form of strict scrutiny” in 
which “a reviewing court would accord the government limited 
deference in satisfying both the compelling-interest and narrow-tailoring 
prongs” of a traditional strict scrutiny inquiry.92  Such discord could be 
good news for gun-control advocates, in whose favor the lower courts 
thus far have sided, by upholding existing laws restricting firearm 
rights.93  But how long the string of decisions in their favor can last is 
uncertain. 
Even though courts thus far have gone out of their way to preserve 
existing gun restrictions, these recent decisions have not quelled 
predictions that statutes will fall.94  Given the brevity with which the 
Supreme Court dispatched its list of presumably constitutional gun-
control laws, a careful analysis by courts should be triggered when 
weighing challenges to such laws, even if they appear to fall within the 
Court’s dicta.  As one commentator noted in an example, Justice 
Scalia—a former school rifle team member—likely did not intend to 
uphold bans on guns used at private schools that teach defensive gun use 
or hunting skills, despite writing that he would support laws banning 
firearms in schools.95  In her dissent to an en banc opinion vacating the 
decision of a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Judge Diane Sykes provided a spirited argument for a more thorough 
review by courts and a greater effort by public officials to defend their 
gun-control restrictions: 
 
 
91. See Cameron Desmond, Comment, From Cities to Schoolyards: The Implications of 
an Individual Right to Bear Arms on the Constitutionality of Gun-Free Zones, 39 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 1043, 1062 (2008). 
92. Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1572 (2009). 
93. See Robert J. Cahall, Note, Local Gun Control Laws After District of Columbia v. 
Heller: Silver Bullets or Shooting Blanks? The Case for Strong State Preemption of Local Gun 
Control Laws, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359, 372–73 (2010). 
94. See William G. Merkel, Heller as Hubris, and How McDonald v. City of Chicago 
May Well Change the Constitutional World as We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221, 
1254 (2010) (predicting that conflicts between the Heller Court’s dicta and Justice Scalia’s 
favoring of gun rights will doom the now-protected restrictions). 
95. See David B. Kopel, Pretend “Gun-Free” School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 515, 518, 522 (2009) (noting separately that Justice Scalia was a member of his 
school’s rifle team and that the Heller dicta should not be read as if it were a statute that 
would allow the ban on their use at private schools that teach defensive gun use or hunting 
skills). 
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[T]here are several ways to understand the Court’s analysis in 
Heller in light of its limiting dicta about exceptions.  But we 
cannot read Heller’s dicta in a way that swallows its holdings.  
The government normally has the burden of justifying the 
application of laws that criminalize the exercise of enumerated 
constitutional rights.  We should follow that norm, not pay lip 
service to it.96 
 
The majority in Heller predicted—indeed, almost invited—these 
challenges.97  Justice Scalia’s opinion referenced the long history of 
litigation that followed the Court’s “first in-depth Free Exercise Clause 
case”98 as support for his lack of specificity about the types of gun-
control laws that would withstand judicial evaluation after the 2008 
decision.99  He also justified the exceptions enumerated in “Heller’s 
asterisk”100 by comparing them to the lack of First Amendment 
protections for “obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets.”101  
Commentators likewise have drawn comparisons between the First and 
Second Amendment in predicting how future cases that elaborate on 
the individual right guaranteed by the Second Amendment will be 
decided.102  Thus, the copious First Amendment jurisprudence that is 
already available could provide worthwhile lessons for those searching 
for a roadmap on how to define the newfound rights guaranteed by the 
Second Amendment. 
III.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A BLUEPRINT FOR EVOLVING SECOND 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Many have suggested, both leading up to and after the decisions in 
 
96. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 654 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., dissenting).  A 
similar sentiment was voiced in a concurring opinion to a Tenth Circuit decision that upheld 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by felons.  See United 
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047–48 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) 
(expressing concern over “the possible tension between Heller’s dictum and its underlying 
holding” and that “the dictum inhibits lower courts from exploring the contours of Heller and 
its application to firearm restrictions”). 
97. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008). 
98. See id. at 635; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878) (upholding a law 
criminalizing polygamy). 
99. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
100. See Larios, supra note 55, at 60 (commenting on “Heller’s Asterisk”). 
101. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
102. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment 
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 377–81, 399 (2009); Desmond, supra note 91, at 1065–71. 
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Heller and McDonald, that the Court should follow the same approach 
in interpreting Second Amendment rights as has been taken to define an 
individual’s rights under the First Amendment.103  Indeed, Justice 
Scalia’s reference to the voluminous case law establishing the Court’s 
jurisprudence in the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause cases 
would seem to bolster this approach.104  Gun-rights proponents likely are 
drawn to the First Amendment because several of its provisions—
namely the freedoms of association and assembly—prompt a strict 
scrutiny review by courts.105  But this ignores other rights under the First 
Amendment that do not receive such protection.106  According to 
Professor Joseph Blocher, “free speech doctrine has been pockmarked 
with categorical exclusions and stretched and trimmed with balancing 
tests.”107  The Court’s decision in Heller, with its enumerated 
exceptions,108 could be interpreted as creating similar categorical carve-
outs for individuals’ Second Amendment rights. 
Under a categorical approach, courts determine the scope of the 
rights protected by the Constitution and then evaluate whether a 
challenged activity infringes upon these protected rights.109  In contrast, 
with the generally defined interest-balancing approach, a court is called 
upon to weigh an individual’s constitutionally-protected right against the 
government’s interest in an activity that infringes on that more broadly-
drawn right.110  As such, categoricalism is seen as a way to remove the 
judge from the equation in defining infringement of a fundamental 
constitutional right or, as conservatives would put it, prevent judicial 
activism.111  As Blocher explains, 
 
103. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 958, 958–59 (2011); Blocher, supra note 102, at 399; Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee 
Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control 
Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 85, 102–03 (2010); Winkler, supra note 34, at 706. 
104. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
105. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 693. 
106. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 402. 
107. Id. 
108. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
109. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 293–94 (1992) (“When categorical formulas operate, all 
the important work in litigation is done at the outset.  Once the relevant right and mode of 
infringement have been described, the outcome follows, without any explicit judicial 
balancing of the claimed right against the government’s justification for the infringement.”). 
110. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 381–82. 
111. See Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 
555, 558 (2010) (arguing that Republican lawmakers have traditionally equated judicial 
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Categoricalism allows a judge to transform some background 
value into a rule that will govern all subsequent cases inside the 
category without any further reference to the background 
principle or value.  The creation of the category cuts off future 
adjudicators from the underlying value and prohibits the 
reweighing of interests.112 
 
The critical factor in categoricalism, therefore, is to define the 
fundamental value protected by the Constitution and ensure that the 
categories of activities that fall within and outside this value are 
protected or excluded from constitutional guarantees.113 
Applied to the First Amendment’s Free Speech doctrine, the 
categories of obscenity, libel, and child pornography have been declared 
by the Court to not receive constitutional protection.114  This would 
appear to be a strong case of categoricalism in which large categories of 
speech are deemed not to receive the constitutional protections 
extended to other types of speech.  But, at the same time, commercial 
speech has been declared to fall under the Free Speech protections of 
the First Amendment, but not under the same level of protection 
accorded to political speech.115  In this aspect of distinguishing the 
protections provided to commercial versus political speech, therefore, 
the Court could be seen as engaging in—and, by extension, instructing 
lower courts also to employ—a sort of interest balancing by evaluating 
whether laws are constitutional under a certain level of scrutiny.  
Likewise, the time, place, and manner restrictions that the Court allows 
for protected speech indicate something other than a categorical 
approach.116  In cases involving such permitted restrictions on 
constitutionally-protected speech, courts have generally applied a form 
 
activism with a willingness to limit government on constitutional grounds). 
112. Blocher, supra note 102, at 382. 
113. See id. at 383 (noting that when a category and underlying value do not align 
“absurdities such as significant over- or underinclusion can undermine the category’s 
legitimacy and stability”). 
114. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (child pornography); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (obscenity); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 
(1964) (libel); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libel). 
115. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (reasoning that 
“[t]o require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech 
alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s 
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech”). 
116. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 397. 
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of intermediate scrutiny in weighing whether the government interest 
justifies the burden on speech.117  Thus, the courts have engaged in 
interest balancing for some forms of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.118 
The differences between the categorical approach and the interest-
balancing approach can be seen in how courts treat offensive, but not 
obscene, speech.  This was the issue before the Court in Federal 
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, the renowned 
case involving the threatened punishment of a radio station for 
broadcasting comedian George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue in 
the middle of a weekday.119  Although the issue was not before the Court 
in the case, if the Court had determined that the monologue was 
obscene, its inquiry would have ended and the Federal Communications 
Commission’s (FCC) actions would have been upheld as an allowable 
regulation on unprotected speech not in violation of the Constitution.120  
On the other end of the spectrum, if the monologue had been 
determined to be of political nature, the Court indicated that the radio 
station could receive absolute protection under the First Amendment 
and the commission’s attempt to regulate it would have been unlawful.121  
Such deference shows the high value that the courts place on political 
speech, and the corresponding high hurdle that the government would 
have to overcome to demonstrate that its interest in regulating such 
speech justified its regulation. 
But, because Carlin’s monologue was merely considered indecent 
with no political bent, the Court evaluated whether the speech deserved 
protection under the First Amendment and how much protection it 
should be afforded through a form of interest balancing that placed a 
lower value on his speech.122  In the end, the Court held that the 
individual circumstances in which such offensive language is used 
determine whether the speech will be constitutionally protected from a 
 
117. See id. at 391–92. 
118. See id.  According to Blocher, “intermediate scrutiny in all of its forms represents 
‘an overtly balancing mode’—perhaps ‘the only genuine balancing mode that we have.’”  Id. 
at 392 (quoting Sullivan, supra note 109, at 297; and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Governmental 
Interests and Unconstitutional Conditions Law: A Case Study in Categorization and Balancing, 
55 ALB. L. REV. 605, 606 (1992)). 
119. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729–30 (1978). 
120. See id. at 742, 746 (noting the radio station’s argument that, as long as the broadcast 
was not obscene, the Constitution does not permit any regulation). 
121. See id. at 746. 
122. See id. at 746–48. 
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particular regulation.123  As Justice Stevens identified in his plurality 
opinion, “the constitutional protection accorded to a communication 
containing such patently offensive sexual and excretory language need 
not be the same in every context.”124 
Turning to the First Amendment for guidance in interpreting the 
Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald, the Court’s exemption for 
laws that forbid the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally 
ill125 could be compared to the First Amendment categorical exemptions 
for “obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets.”126  Does this then 
endorse a categorical approach in interpreting the Second Amendment?  
In a categorical approach, laws are evaluated on whether they fall within 
a category protected by an underlying value of a right in which 
regulation will not be permitted127 as opposed to, say, whether the law is 
“rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives”128 or 
“substantially related to an important governmental objective,”129 as 
provided under different levels of scrutiny.  When considered within the 
right to protect oneself in one’s home, laws that single out certain types 
of people (e.g., felons and the mentally ill)130 and weapons (e.g., firearms 
not in common use at our nation’s founding),131 and that are generally 
unnecessary to protect that right should be found constitutional.  This 
would appear to be the Court endorsing a categorical approach to 
interpreting the infringement of an individual’s Second Amendment 
right. 
But the Heller Court’s allowance for laws that exclude “the carrying 
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings”132 more closely resembles “time, place, and manner 
restrictions” under the First Amendment,133 which require courts to 
 
123. See id. at 747–48. 
124. Id. at 747. 
125. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010); District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
126. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
127. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 382. 
128. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (stating that this is the minimum 
requirement to uphold the constitutionality of government legislation). 
129. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (defining this as intermediate scrutiny, 
applicable to classes based on gender or illegitimacy). 
130. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
131. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627; United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939). 
132. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
133. See Desmond, supra note 91, at 1065–71. 
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apply an interest-balancing approach.134  Using time, place, and manner 
restrictions, the Court has upheld content-neutral regulations on speech 
such as requiring parade licenses,135 limiting where abortion protesters 
can demonstrate,136 and mandating volume controls at outdoor 
concerts137 by weighing the restrictions’ reasonableness in service of a 
significant government interest against the First Amendment rights of 
the regulated speakers.138  A court could determine that the Heller Court 
meant to allow a similar balancing of the government’s interest in 
protecting “sensitive places” against an individual’s Second Amendment 
right to carry a firearm.139  Certainly, such a restriction is analogous to 
the First Amendment’s restrictions that acknowledge certain places 
where speech can be restricted.140  Thus, the Court could be seen to have 
endorsed the same level of interest balancing that is used to evaluate the 
First Amendment’s time, place, and manner restrictions for the Second 
Amendment’s “sensitive places” restrictions: intermediate scrutiny.141 
One resolution to this conundrum, in which the Court appears to 
endorse both categoricalism and some form of interest balancing, 
suggests that the category of rights established for protection by Heller 
relates to whether such a right was subject to regulation at the time of 
the writing of the Constitution.142  Essentially, this view determines the 
values protected by the Second Amendment based on the types of laws 
that existed when the amendment was ratified.143  Several aspects of the 
Heller decision, including its lengthy discourse on eighteenth-century 
laws, dictionary terms, and nineteenth-century interpretations,144 support 
this historical approach.  “Heller’s asterisk” refers to the possibility of 
 
134. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 397. 
135. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). 
136. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994). 
137. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789–92 (1989). 
138. See id. at 791. 
139. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 408. 
140. Although the Court has declared that students do not shed their constitutional 
rights at the schoolhouse door, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
506 (1969), it also has determined that more restrictions can be placed on speech within the 
school environment than in other public places, id. at 507. 
141. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 391–92, 397. 
142. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 649–51 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting).  Judge Sykes asserted in Skoien that where historians disagree about the status of 
a particular law at the time of ratification, courts should be hesitant about upholding laws that 
infringe upon an individual’s Second Amendment rights.  Id. at 651. 
143. See id. 
144. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580–619 (2008). 
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employing “exhaustive historical analysis” to determine the “full scope 
of the Second Amendment” as well as whether the “longstanding” 
prohibitions on Second Amendment rights are still lawful.145  
Furthermore, the Court interprets the ruling in United States v. Miller as 
a restriction on the protection of weapons “in common use at the time” 
of the Second Amendment’s ratification, finding that the earlier Court 
had difficulty with the type of weapon involved in the case and not that 
the possession was unrelated to militia activity.146  Under this type of 
historical interpretation, a law is presumptively constitutional if it or an 
analogous restriction was employed in 1791.147  This approach was 
arguably taken by Judge Sykes in her original opinion for a three-judge 
panel of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Skoien,148 which was 
overturned by an en banc decision.149  In her dissent to that later 
decision, Judge Sykes criticized her colleagues for not undertaking a 
historical review of the gun-control law challenged in the case (a federal 
statute forbidding those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence 
from possessing firearms)150 to determine whether it violated the Second 
Amendment.151 
But there are problems with this approach, namely the burden it 
places upon inexpert judges with weighty caseloads to conduct adequate 
historical research before determining the constitutionality of the 
nation’s myriad gun-control laws.152  Such examinations also could 
produce results even more confusing than under the categorical 
approach, upholding regulations solely based on whether they existed at 
the time of the country’s founding while ruling out regulations without 
such historical ties that would otherwise deserve to be upheld.153 
 
145. Id. at 626–27; see also Larios, supra note 55, at 60 (commenting on “Heller’s 
Asterisk”). 
146. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
147. Texas Upholds Gun Regulation, supra note 68, at 831. 
148. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, 614 F.3d 638 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
149. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 644–45. 
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). 
151. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 648 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for 
interpreting a categorical protection for a law criminalizing persons convicted of 
misdemeanor domestic violence when whether “categorical disarmament is proper as part of 
the original meaning of the Second Amendment has not been established” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
152. See Texas Upholds Gun Regulation, supra note 68, at 833. 
153. See id. 
HETZNER-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2011  1:17 PM 
2011] WHERE ANGELS TREAD 381 
Furthermore, it is not apparent that such a historical approach could 
be taken when determining the constitutionality of limiting an 
individual’s Second Amendment rights in particular places.  Although a 
ban on the possession of deadly weapons by felons or the mentally ill 
could have a seemingly clear-cut historical basis, defining what 
constitutes a “sensitive” place requires a flexibility not afforded by a 
strictly historical, categorical approach.  Airports, for example, pose a 
problem that a historical analysis would have to contort itself to solve; 
so too, in an age of fear about biological or other forms of terrorism, do 
water treatment plants and even food distribution facilities.154 
What is likely to result, then, is precisely what commentators and the 
Court itself suggested in Heller: a combination of categorical and 
interest-balancing approaches to enforcing the Second Amendment.155  
Those laws that exclude certain types of people from receiving permits 
to carry firearms or restrict certain types of firearms will likely 
constitute a categorical exception to the Second Amendment’s 
protection of an individual right to possess a handgun for ready use in 
self-defense and be evaluated according to whether they fall within or 
outside of the scope of that right.  At the same time, those laws that 
restrict the possession of firearms in certain places will most likely be 
evaluated by whether they are tied closely enough to a government 
interest that justifies an infringement on a constitutional right, perhaps 
with special deference paid to whether that restriction was present at the 
time of ratification and is presumptively lawful. 
IV.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONE LAWS 
AFTER HELLER AND MCDONALD 
Following the Court’s decision in Heller, numerous lawsuits were 
filed in both federal and state courts challenging the constitutionality of 
gun-control laws.156  Two of those suits sought to overturn school zone 
laws in California and Wisconsin that restricted the possession of 
 
154. See Mara Rose Williams, On the Front Lines of Bioterror Defense—Killer 
Pathogens Could Bring Disaster: K-State Experts Lead the Way, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 25, 
2006, at A1. 
155. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 413 (arguing that although the Heller majority 
professed to be taking a categorical approach, in defining whether laws violate an individual’s 
Second Amendment rights, the Court likely will adopt a mixture of categoricalism and 
interest balancing as it has done with the First Amendment). 
156. See, e.g., supra note 64 and sources cited therein. 
HETZNER-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2011  1:17 PM 
382 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:359 
firearms within 1000 feet of school grounds.157  A district court judge 
upheld the California law against the pro se attack.158  Meanwhile, the 
Wisconsin Legislature likely rendered moot the pending lawsuit 
challenging its statute when it erased the 1000-foot gun-free perimeter 
around state schools for licensed carriers.159  As this Comment will 
argue, however, there is a better way for legislatures to approach the 
issue in preserving citizens’ Second Amendment rights and protecting 
schoolchildren from violence.160  This bears consideration both in states 
that already have changed their laws and those concerned that existing 
statutes might not survive legal challenges. 
Although one district court has already upheld the federal school 
zone law against a Second Amendment challenge,161 a federal appeals 
court previously raised questions about whether the law would survive 
judicial scrutiny.162  The Fifth Circuit introduced the possibility of a 
successful challenge in a footnote to its decision in United States v. 
Lopez, a case that resulted in the prior version of the federal Gun-Free 
School Zones Act being ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
on Commerce Clause grounds.163  The appellate court wrote in the pre-
Heller decision, “It is also conceivable that some applications of section 
922(q) might raise Second Amendment concerns.  Lopez does not raise 
the Second Amendment and thus we do not now consider it.  
Nevertheless, this orphan of the Bill of Rights may be something of a 
brooding omnipresence here.”164 
Although the Fifth Circuit opinion predates the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Heller and McDonald, little from those recent opinions 
would explicitly shield school zone laws today.  The Heller decision 
qualifies the types of gun-control laws that would be found 
constitutional with the word “longstanding,”165 while also protecting laws 
 
157. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *1, *16 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011); Wisconsin Carry Complaint, supra note 26, at 11–12. 
158. See Garcia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *1, *16. 
159. WIS. STAT. § 948.605 (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 35, §§ 91–96. 
160. See infra Part V. 
161. See United States v. Lewis, 50 V.I. 995, 1000–01 (D.V.I. 2008). 
162. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364 n.46 (5th Cir. 1993). 
163. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
164. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364 n.46. 
165. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).  The common 
interpretation appears to be that the Court was affirming longstanding laws prohibiting 
firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill as well as longstanding prohibitions on 
firearm possession in sensitive places.  See Texas Upholds Gun Regulation, supra note 68, at 
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prohibiting firearm possession “in” sensitive places such as schools.166  A 
Court that reached back to the 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s 
dictionary to supply a definition for its opinion would be unlikely to 
view the state or federal school zone acts as longstanding.167  
Furthermore, individuals within the 1000-foot school zone perimeter are 
arguably not “in” sensitive areas. 
The preceding sections contained an examination of the types of 
review that the Court endorsed in its decisions in Heller and McDonald 
as well as those that have been recommended by observers.168  Although 
the standard of review is yet to be determined, the best way to apply the 
Court’s decision in future Second Amendment cases would be through a 
two-part test.169  First, a court must ask whether a challenged regulation 
implicates a right protected by the Second Amendment by looking at 
whether the restrictions (1) impose upon firearm possession by a 
category of people or type of firearms that have not been subject to 
 
832.  It also could be argued that the “longstanding” modifier only applies to the first part of 
the sentence and not the laws identified farther from this modifier.  In that case, laws that 
restrict firearm possession in sensitive places and laws that place “conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” would be viewed as constitutional regardless of 
when they were instituted.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
166. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
167. See id. at 581. 
168. See supra Parts II–III. 
169. Several courts and commentators have suggested similar approaches, although the 
one suggested here may not be completely identical.  The Third Circuit has advocated an 
approach that starts the inquiry by asking whether a challenged law burdens conduct falling 
within the Second Amendment’s protection.  See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 
(3d. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958, 958–59 (2011).  If it does not, the law is 
constitutional.  Id.  If the law does implicate protected conduct, then the court should subject 
the law to means-end scrutiny to determine if the law is constitutional or invalid.  Id.  The 
Fourth Circuit has applied this two-prong approach.  See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 
673, 680–82 (4th Cir. 2010).  One commentator also supports a similar two-prong approach, 
suggesting that the first prong regarding whether a challenged activity is protected by the 
Second Amendment be based on whether the challenged regulation implicates a lawful 
purpose of firearm use or a class of firearms in use at the time of ratification.  See Gould, 
supra note 92, at 1562–64.  In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Sykes started the analysis in her 
later-vacated opinion by evaluating whether a law is categorically invalid under the Second 
Amendment or, alternately, valid because it regulates conduct “that falls outside of the term 
of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was certified.”  United States v. 
Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).  A court 
need perform no further exploration for such a categorically valid law, she wrote.  Id. at 809.  
But all other laws should be subjected to a level of means-end scrutiny based on “how closely 
the law comes to the core right and severity of the law’s burden on that right,” according to 
Sykes’ analysis.  Id. 
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“longstanding” laws that prohibit their possession170 or (2) infringe upon 
a lawful purpose for firearm possession (i.e., not just “any sort of 
confrontation”).171  If enforcement of the law does not impose upon a 
lawful purpose of firearm possession by all people, but instead imposes 
blanket restrictions upon a class of people that have not been subject to 
such legal regulations for very long or upon a group of weaponry 
commonly in use at the time of ratification, then a court should 
categorically strike the law down.172  If a court finds that the regulation 
implicates the second category, however, by infringing upon an 
otherwise lawful purpose no matter who the law applies to or what types 
of firearms it regulates, the court must determine if the regulation is 
constitutional by evaluating whether the challenged restriction survives 
a certain standard of review.173 
Given that the school zone laws potentially fall into the second type 
of restriction—implicating a lawful purpose of firearm possession rather 
than banning possession by a class of persons or of a group of 
weaponry—this Comment will evaluate the constitutionality of the 
states’ school zone laws by analyzing whether the right to carry a loaded 
firearm on public property within 1000 feet of a school is protected by 
the Second Amendment.  The analysis will continue by assessing 
whether the laws can still survive different levels of scrutiny that could 
be applied by the courts if they were to find that the school zone laws 
infringe upon a protected right.  The origins of these laws are important 
in determining how much deference courts should grant to the drafters 
of the school zone laws. 
A.  The Development of Gun-Free School Zone Laws 
Laws in California and Illinois banning the possession of loaded 
firearms within 1000 feet of schools were adopted within five years of 
each other and the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act during the first 
half of the 1990s.174  At the time, widely publicized incidents had raised 
 
170. See, e.g., Chester, 628 F.3d at 676, 680; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89–95; Skoien, 587 
F.3d at 808–09; Gould, supra note 92, at 1562–64. 
171. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 
172. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91, 94; Gould, supra note 92, at 1563–64. 
173. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 676; Skoien, 587 F.3d at 809; Gould, supra note 92, at 1562–
64. 
174. See 87th GEN. ASSEMB., H.R. TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 150–51 (Ill. June 18, 1992) 
(statement of Rep. Laurino); SENATE FLOOR BILL ANALYSIS OF AB 645, at 1 (Cal. Aug. 22, 
1994); Andrew Gottesman, Guns Are Shattering Quiet Around Schools in Suburbs, CHI. 
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fears about the safety of schools.175  In advocating for the federal law in 
1990, U.S. Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin highlighted cases of 
individuals who killed or wounded children with firearms on school 
grounds as well as concerns about the escalating presence of weaponry 
among students.176  When the law was revised, President Bill Clinton 
reiterated the purpose of the law as a way to combat campus violence 
and keep schools safe.177 
In June 1992, the Illinois General Assembly passed an amendment 
adding a firearms ban to an existing statute that outlawed drugs within 
1000 feet of schools, parks, and public housing.178  Arguing in favor of 
passage of the new law, Illinois State Representative Bill Laurino 
referenced increasing problems with violence, not just in the city of 
Chicago, but throughout the state.179  Representative Laurino stated the 
following on the floor of the Illinois House of Representatives: 
 
This year alone we’re already about 20% ahead of last year’s 
record-setting [murder] rate and this piece of legislation is trying 
to put a cap on some of these people that think it’s okay just to 
drive around your neighborhoods and use innocent people as 
targets, just because they think it’s fun.180 
 
During the 1992–1993 school year, “158 guns were confiscated on or 
near public school grounds” in Chicago.181  Similarly, California’s law 
was introduced as an answer to a concern about the growing issue of 
school violence in that state.182 
 
TRIB., Sept. 23, 1993, § 1, at 1. 
175. See Jeremy Gerard, Jennings Creates a Gun-Control Special, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
1990, at C18; Schools Are Relatively Safe, U.S. Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, § 1, at 
40; Walsh, supra note 1, at D1. 
176. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
177. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A 
DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT OF 
1990, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-72, at 1 (1995) (“I am committed to doing everything in my power 
to make schools places where young people can be secure, where they can learn, and where 
parents can be confident that discipline is enforced.”). 
178. See 87th GEN. ASSEMB., H.R. TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 143, 151 (Ill. June 18, 
1992) (statement of Rep. Laurino). 
179. See id. at 150. 
180. Id. 
181. See Andrew Gottesman, Guns Are Shattering Quiet Around Schools in Suburbs, 
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 1993, § 1, at 1. 
182. See SENATE FLOOR BILL ANALYSIS OF AB 645, at 1 (Cal. Aug. 22, 1994).  A 
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Although linked, the federal and state laws vary in certain ways.  
The federal Gun-Free School Zones Act makes it a crime to knowingly 
possess a firearm that has moved in or otherwise affects interstate or 
foreign commerce within 1000 feet of a public or private school.183  The 
law makes exceptions if possession is on private, non-school grounds; if 
the state has licensed the individual to carry the firearm; if the firearm is 
not loaded and is contained in a locked container or firearm rack within 
a motor vehicle; if the firearm’s use is part of a school-sanctioned 
program; if the possession is by law enforcement in an official capacity; 
or if the firearm is unloaded and carried by a person gaining access to 
hunting grounds and has been approved by school personnel.184 
The law was originally adopted in 1990 before being invalidated in 
1995 by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ 
lawmaking power under the Commerce Clause.185  Congress re-enacted 
the law in 1996, introducing the limitation that the firearm must have 
moved in interstate commerce.186  While that revision did little to limit 
the law’s potential application,187 the federal law has been regarded as 
“mostly irrelevant” given that many states and school districts already 
had their own bans by the time it was enacted188 and criminal activity and 
education have traditionally been governed by state law.189  In addition, 
the enactment of state laws in recent years that expanded the permitting 
of firearms also has limited the federal law’s effect, given its exception 
that allows licensed individuals within the 1000-foot gun-free zone.190  
 
measure proposed as a penalty enhancer for felonies committed by gang members within 
1000 feet of schools was to address the fact that “[a] bulk of actual violence and crime occurs 
right around the campus.”  ASSEMB. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, BILL ANALYSIS OF AB 645, at 
2 (Cal. Apr. 20, 1993).  According to the measure’s author, “increas[ing] penalties for crimes 
committed in a school zone will hopefully deter such actions around our schools and provide 
a greater degree of safety for our children and teachers.”  Id.  School zone law opponents, 
however, point out that prior to passage of the federal law in 1990, only seven shootings had 
taken place at American schools; in contrast, seventy-eight incidents followed in the 
seventeen years after passage of that law and similar state statutes.  See Kopel, supra note 95, 
at 519. 
183. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 § 1702(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2) (2006). 
184. See id. 
185. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–52 (1995). 
186. See Chamberlin, supra note 28, at 331; Kopel, supra note 95, at 519. 
187. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A 
DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT OF 
1990, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-72, at 1 (1995). 
188. See Kopel, supra note 95, at 518–19. 
189. See Chamberlin, supra note 28, at 306. 
190. See Kopel, supra note 95, at 518–20.  Since 1961, forty states have implemented 
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That could change, however, with the recent movement toward 
“constitutional carry” laws where certain residents are allowed to carry 
firearms—openly or concealed—without obtaining a state permit.191  If 
such permissive laws result in fewer residents obtaining permits from 
their states, then the federal law may see new life—as well as face new 
legal challenges. 
Neither Illinois nor California’s school zone law exempts licensed 
gun carriers; thus, those statutes are currently more restrictive than the 
federal version.192  In addition, the California law provides an exception 
for when the person has obtained a restraining order and is in fear of 
danger193 and only applies to firearms “capable of being concealed on 
the person.”194  The Illinois law, on the other hand, appears more 
restrictive and has fewer exceptions than either the California or federal 
law.195  Not only does the Illinois statute establish similar 1000-foot gun-
free perimeters around public parks, courthouses, public transportation 
facilities, and public housing projects, but the only exceptions it allows 
to these prohibitions are for law enforcement and school security 
officers as well as students who have school permission.196 
Other states provide varying levels of regulations on gun possession 
on school grounds.  A few states have no statutes criminalizing firearms 
on or near school grounds or they have laws that sanction firearm 
possession by an extremely limited group of adults or only for certain 
purposes on school grounds.197  More common are general prohibitions 
 
“shall issue” laws—many of them passed in the 1980s and 1990s, where permits to carry 
concealed handguns are not issued on subjective standards; in the forty-eight states that issue 
permits to carry concealed weapons, the expectation is that the permits are valid throughout 
the states with only a few exceptions.  Id. 
191. See State Firearms Laws Are Taking a Radical, Dangerous Turn, supra note 29. 
192. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011), and 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(1)–(1.5) (West 2010), with Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 
§ 1702(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2) (2006). 
193. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(c)(3). 
194. See id. § 626.9(c)(2). 
195. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(2)–(3), with 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2), 
and CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9. 
196. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(2)–(3), with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(q)(2)(b) (allowing exceptions for private property not part of school grounds, approved 
school programs, an individual acting in accordance with a contract between the school and 
the individual, and law enforcement officers acting in an official capacity), and CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 626.9(m)–(o) (allowing exceptions for authorized security guards, existing shooting 
ranges on a school campus, and authorized honorably-retired peace officers). 
197. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(c) (LexisNexis 2005) (prohibiting possession with 
intent to do bodily harm of a firearm on public school grounds); ALASKA STAT. 
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on loaded firearms within schools or at school-sanctioned events.198  
These laws assign differing levels of knowledge, exemptions, and 
penalties to the criminal possession of firearms on school grounds.199  
California and Illinois are the only remaining states that establish 1000-
foot perimeters around school grounds on which the vast majority of 
citizens could not legally transport loaded firearms while on public 
property, although some states establish 1000-foot zones for the purpose 
of forbidding unpermitted users from being near schools.200  Both 
 
§ 11.61.195(a)(2)(A) (2010) (penalizing possession of firearms by felon on school grounds or 
adjacent parking lots); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-5-704, 76-10-505.5 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(forbidding non-licensed firearm possessors on school grounds).  Many statutes also allow 
individual schools to decide whether to permit individuals to carry loaded weapons on school 
grounds.  See infra note 200.  The superintendent of a Texas school district that allows guns in 
its schools justified this position by saying, “to say that the only people who can protect 
themselves have to [have] a badge . . . that’s just ludicrous.”  See Stacy Teicher Khadaroo, 
School Shootings: In Nebraska, a Proposal to Arm Teachers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 
19, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2011/0119/School-shootings-In-
Nebraska-a-proposal-to-arm-teachers. 
198. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-119 
(1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-105.5 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217b (West 
2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302D (2004); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 35-47-9-2 (LexisNexis 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.4B (West 2003); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-4204 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.070 (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. 
STAT ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6552 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-102 (LexisNexis 2002); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10(j) (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.237a(4) 
(West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.66 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
37-17 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
1204.04 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.265 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:39-5(e) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2.1 (2004); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 265.01 (Consol. 2000 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 (2009); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-05 (2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1277 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 912 (West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-420, -430 (2003); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-7 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1309 (2010); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4004 (2009); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.280 (West 2010); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-11a (LexisNexis 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(t) (2011). 
199. See statutes cited supra note 198. 
200. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1442, 1457 (2007) (defining permitted users as law 
enforcement and security officials, students possessing a deadly weapon as part of a course 
instruction, people possessing the weapon as a part of recreational or sporting activity, and 
those with a weapon within a private residence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.115 (West 2007) 
(providing that permitted gun holders include individuals within 1000 feet of a school that 
carry firearms when enrolled in school-approved programs or classes, are on an on-campus 
firearm training range, store a weapon in a vehicle in a manner consistent with school policy, 
or are law enforcement officers, but criminalizing the unlawful discharge of these weapons 
within the gun-free zone); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) 
(prohibiting firearm possession by licensed carriers in schools but not within 1000 feet of 
school property). 
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Wisconsin and Louisiana had school zone laws similar to California and 
Illinois’ until state lawmakers recently amended their state statutes to 
permit individuals who had been given concealed carry licenses to 
possess their weapons within the 1000-foot zone.201 
The unique school zone laws in California202 as well as in Wisconsin203 
(before the Wisconsin state legislature’s recent revision)204 drew legal 
opposition following the Court’s Heller decision.205  The legal challenge 
to Wisconsin’s former school zone statute that had been pending in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin alleged that the 
law “covers such a broad area that it practically forecloses a meaningful 
right to keep and bear arms in large parts of the state.”206  For example, a 
map depicting the approximate locations of school zones in Milwaukee 
covered the majority of the city,207 including a gas station where one of 
the plaintiffs allegedly was arrested for violating the statute.208  The 
plaintiffs and other members of Wisconsin Carry, Inc. said that they 
“desire to exercise their state and federal constitutional rights to bear 
arms but are in fear of doing so because they live, work, and spend 
leisure time within 1000 feet of schools.”209  One of the plaintiffs, who 
was planning an “open carry picnic” at his home in Greenfield, 
Wisconsin, where attendees would be encouraged to carry firearms 
 
201. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2; WIS. STAT. § 948.605 (2009–2010); Ed 
Anderson, Bills to Stop Contractors Who Bribe Are Now Law - Measures to Fight Public 
Corruption, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 8, 2010, at A2 (describing different laws 
signed by Governor Jindal, including a change to gun-free school zones); Jason Stein, 
Concealed Weapons Bill Signed; State Law to Take Effect in November; Effect on Safety Still 
Debated, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 10, 2011, at B1 (noting the governor’s signing of gun 
bill that included eliminating penalty for concealed carry permit holders within school zones). 
Interestingly, the Louisiana amendment was enacted the day after another firearm 
restriction—a prohibition on carrying guns in places of worship—was curbed with the signing 
of a law that allows concealed weapons in houses of worship as part of security efforts.  See 
Ed Anderson & Jan Moller, ‘Gun-in-Church’ Bill Is Signed into Law by Jindal - It Goes into 
Effect on Aug. 15, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 7, 2010, at A2. 
202. CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011). 
203. WIS. STAT. § 948.605 (2009–2010). 
204. See 2011 Wis. Act 35, §§ 91–96. 
205. See supra note 26 and sources cited therein. 
206. Wisconsin Carry Complaint, supra note 26, at 8. 
207. Id. 
208. See id.  In its response to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the City of Milwaukee and Kurt 
Kezeske denied that plaintiff Bernson had been arrested for possession of a handgun within 
1000 feet of a school.  See Answer of Defendants City of Milwaukee and Kurt Kezeske to 
Amended Complaint at 5, Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, No. 2:10-cv-9-CNC 
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 23, 2010). 
209. Wisconsin Carry Complaint, supra note 26, at 8. 
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lawfully and unconcealed, was allegedly warned regarding his event in a 
letter from the city’s chief of police.210  The chief of police allegedly 
cautioned that the “property is barely 50 feet outside of a school zone.  
Any picnic attendee straying into the school zone while armed risks 
arrest and prosecution.”211 
In the California case, a San Francisco man brought a lawsuit 
questioning the constitutionality of his state’s school zone law after local 
school officials refused to give him permission to carry a firearm near an 
elementary school.212  Software programmer Kevin Hall, who lived 
within 1000 feet of a school and represented himself in the case,213 
asserted in his lawsuit that he wished to carry the weapon for self-
defense,214 which was the crux of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Heller.215  But Hall’s statements to a local blogger cast doubt on his true 
reasons for filing the lawsuit after being rejected by the school.  Hall 
stated that “[i]f they had said, ‘You can do it,’ [he] probably wouldn’t be 
interested.”216  A federal court rejected Hall’s challenge in March 2011, 
finding that the burdens the school zone law imposed on him were not 
great enough to implicate his Second Amendment rights.217  The court 
reasoned, “[T]he law has no impact on Hall’s right to possess a handgun 
at home or on any other private property.  Hall also is not restricted 
from carrying a firearm in a school zone in a locked container or in the 
locked trunk of a car.”218 
B.  The Second Amendment Protection for an Individual’s Right to Carry 
a Loaded Weapon Within 1000 Feet of a School 
Looking to Heller and McDonald for guidance, the first issue that 
courts must consider when determining if a law violates an individual 
right protected by the Second Amendment is whether the challenged 
restriction implicates a core constitutional right.219  In evaluating the 
 
210. Id. at 6–7. 
211. Id. at 7. 
212. See Complaint at 4–5, Hall v. Garcia, No. CV10-3799 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010). 
213. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 17, 2011); Smith, supra note 26. 
214. See Complaint at 1, Garcia, No. CV10-3799. 
215. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). 
216. Smith, supra note 26. 
217. See Garcia, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *14–16. 
218. Id. 
219. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958, 958–59 (2011). 
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scope of the right protected by the Second Amendment, the Third 
Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella parsed the text and structure of 
the Heller decision, finding that the Court intended to “protect[] the 
right of law-abiding citizens to possess non-dangerous weapons for self-
defense in the home” along with the right of citizens to possess firearms 
for purposes that were lawful pre-ratification.220  The three-judge panel 
of the Third Circuit, however, fell short in applying this understanding 
to whether the Second Amendment protected defendant Michael 
Marzzarella’s right to possess a handgun with an obliterated serial 
number.221  While finding that unmarked firearms are not protected as a 
class of weaponry by the Second Amendment, the panel determined 
that the right to possess a handgun with an obliterated serial number 
could still deserve constitutional protection.222  The court reasoned in 
favor of this possibility “because [the defendant’s] possession of the 
Titan pistol in his home implicates his interest in the defense of hearth 
and home—the core protection of the Second Amendment.”223  But the 
panel ultimately left unanswered the question of whether such 
possession actually is protected, stating that Marzzarella’s challenge 
would fail anyway because the government’s restriction would survive 
the court’s evaluation under an intermediate scrutiny standard of 
review.224 
In United States v. Chester, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit 
determined that individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic 
violence retain their Second Amendment rights.225  In doing so, the 
panel distinguished misdemeanants from felons, whom the Court in 
Heller and McDonald singled out in their exemption from Second 
Amendment protections, and evaluated the historical foundations of the 
law at issue.226  Although the panel found “inconclusive” the historical 
evidence that prohibitions on felons possessing firearms were a 
“founding era understanding,” it also determined that such prohibitions 
were at least more longstanding than the federal law applying to persons 
convicted of misdemeanors.227  The panel remanded the case to the 
 
220. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92. 
221. See id. at 95. 
222. See id. at 94–95. 
223. Id. at 94. 
224. See id. at 95. 
225. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680–82 (4th Cir. 2010). 
226. See id. at 676–77. 
227. Id. at 680–81.  The court noted that the federal law dispossessing felons of firearms 
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district court so that the government could submit arguments, under an 
intermediate scrutiny standard, that a reasonable fit exists between the 
law and a “substantial” governmental objective.228 
The first stage of applying this kind of analysis to school zone 
statutes requires determining whether these laws implicate a lawful 
purpose protected by the Second Amendment.229  It is necessary to 
evaluate the laws using this approach because the laws do not appear to 
be protected as a category based on their historical underpinnings or 
longstanding legal roots.230  The laws have only been in place for twenty 
years and, therefore, lack the “historical justification” that earned the 
Court’s blessing in Heller.231 
At least one court has deemed school zone laws presumptively legal 
due to Heller’s list of exceptions.232  But that might have been a mistake.  
Although the Supreme Court specifically included schools as examples 
of “sensitive places” where laws forbidding the possession of firearms 
would be considered “presumptively lawful,”233 it is not clear whether 
the Court intended to include areas near such sensitive places within its 
list, as would be required to protect the 1000-foot radius of the gun-free 
school zones.  The Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald used the 
preposition “in” when referring to schools,234 as opposed to using 
“around” or “near” (words that might have provided better 
constitutional protection to the 1000-foot perimeter established by the 
California and Illinois laws). 
Of course, that is not to say that the Court might not have 
considered the area immediately outside of a school to be a sensitive 
place.  If a school is a proper place from which firearms could 
 
has existed “in some form or another since the 1930s.”  Id. at 681. 
228. Id. at 683. 
229. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
230. See supra notes 165–73 and accompanying text.  It should be noted, however, there 
are some historical groundings for some of the restrictions placed on firearms for some of the 
“sensitive places” considered by the Court.  See Larson, supra note 52, at 1378–79.  Professor 
Carlton F.W. Larson points out that a Missouri law that made it illegal to carry a firearm into 
a school was upheld by that state’s Supreme Court in 1886.  Id. 
231. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
232. See United States v. Lewis, 50 V.I. 995, 1000–01 (2008).  The court declined to enter 
into a discussion about what level of scrutiny should apply.  Id.  Instead, it stated, “It is 
beyond peradventure that a school zone, where [the defendant] is alleged to have possessed a 
firearm, is precisely the type of location of which Heller spoke.  Indeed, Heller unambiguously 
forecloses a Second Amendment challenge to that offense under any level of scrutiny.”  Id. 
233. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 626–27 & n.26. 
234. Id. at 626; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). 
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constitutionally be kept from entering, then it is likely that the public 
sidewalk just outside that school, which the schoolchildren entering and 
exiting the schools have to traverse, also could be considered sensitive.  
And, certainly, the Court was aware of the existence of laws 
criminalizing the possession of firearms near schools.235  But this 
question—to where such a sensitive zone extends and whether a 1000-
foot perimeter can be justified in light of the burden it imposes on 
individuals’ Second Amendment rights—is more properly considered as 
part of a court’s standard of scrutiny review in the second part of this 
inquiry. 
Therefore, in evaluating whether the laws implicate a lawful 
purpose, it is important to start by noting that the school zone laws 
exempt the transportation of firearms within the 1000-foot perimeter 
that are (1) unloaded and encased,236 (2) for target practice on school 
shooting grounds,237 (3) carried by law enforcement or school security 
officers,238 (4) allowed with the consent of school authorities,239 or (5) on 
private property not part of school grounds.240  Additionally, Illinois’ law 
includes a provision that exempts carrying firearms for hunting,241 and 
California exempts individuals who believe they are in grave danger 
from someone against whom they have a court order.242  The California 
law also requires that an individual knows, or reasonably should know, 
that he is in a school zone to support a conviction.243  As such, the most 
likely challenge to a school zone law in any of these jurisdictions would 
probably center on whether the law interferes with the need for 
immediate self-defense in a public place.  It is arguable whether the 
 
235. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *12–13 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (stating the Heller Court “was certainly cognizant” of the federal 
gun-free school zone law and its criminal penalties for firearm possession within 1000 feet of 
schools). 
236. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 § 1702(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(iii) 
(2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(c)(2) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3) (West 2010). 
237. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(iv) (permitting firearm use by individuals in school-
approved programs); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(n); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3). 
238. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(vi); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(m)–(o); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3). 
239. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(v); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(b); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3). 
240. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(i); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(c)(1). 
241. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3). 
242. CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(c)(3). 
243. Id. § 626.9(b). 
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Court provided such protection in Heller or McDonald. 
Central to the Court’s holding in both Heller and McDonald was the 
protection of the individual right to self-defense in one’s own home,244 
which is still protected in school zone laws by the exemption of their 
application to private property outside of school grounds.245  The laws 
also allow the carrying of firearms within the gun-free zones, so long as 
the weapons are unloaded and encased.246  What a plaintiff likely would 
have to argue, then, is that the ban on loaded firearms on public 
property within 1000 feet of school grounds infringes on an individual’s 
right to defend oneself in public by requiring individuals to travel for 
brief times within the zones with unloaded and encased firearms.  
Although unloading and placing into a case a handgun that one wishes 
to carry in public might constitute a burden, it is not clear that this is a 
burden on a constitutional right that has thus far been recognized by the 
Supreme Court.  Both the Heller and McDonald decisions focus on 
restrictions on the use of handguns in the home, where, the Heller 
majority states, “the need for defense of self, family, and property is 
most acute.”247 
It would be a misreading of the Court’s cases, however, to limit their 
holdings to protect an individual’s right to possess a handgun solely on 
one’s own property.  The overwhelming thrust of the majority’s concern 
was on the ability of firearms to be used for self-defense.248  To the 
Court, the fact that the challenged laws in both cases extended to one’s 
home simply underscored the extent of their infringement upon this 
right.249  Indeed, the fact that the Court found the need to declare that 
bans on weapons in sensitive places such as government buildings and 
schools were permissible shows that it foresaw the potential extension of 
the Second Amendment right to public places.250  However, the Court’s 
 
244. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010); District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008). 
245. See Stein, supra note 201.  This, of course, would not extend to Illinois residents 
who live in public housing, where the state law also prohibits firearm possession.  See 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(1.5)–(2). 
246. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(c)(2); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3). 
247. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
248. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3048; Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (stating self-defense “was 
the central component of the right itself”). 
249. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3105; Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
250. See Larson, supra note 52, at 1384 (noting that “if the right has little applicability 
outside the home, there would be no need for the Court to single out ‘sensitive’ places, as 
opposed to places outside the home more generally”). 
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limitation on such public possession of firearms should not have a 
bearing on whether the Court recognized a right to possess a weapon in 
public for the purpose of self-defense.  Such restrictions are more 
properly evaluated under the prong of this two-part test that employs 
different possible standards of review to see whether they are 
constitutionally valid.251 
Thus, it is likely the Court established in Heller and McDonald that 
the right to possess a firearm for purposes of self-defense extended 
outside of the home to public places and that the 1000-foot perimeter 
established by the school zone acts implicates this right. 
C.  Gun-Free School Zone Laws’ Chances of Surviving Challenges Based 
on Different Levels of Scrutiny 
The problem for courts in evaluating the school zone acts then 
would likely boil down to which level of scrutiny to employ to analyze 
the laws’ constitutionality.  One district court that examined the federal 
Gun-Free School Zones Act failed to even consider this question, much 
like the Heller majority, determining the Court “foreclose[d] a Second 
Amendment challenge” to laws forbidding the possession of a firearm in 
a school zone “under any level of scrutiny.”252  The district court that 
examined the California law also did not confine itself to determining 
the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply253 or even, for that matter, to 
whether school zone laws should be considered categorically 
constitutional.254  Because the courts declined to analyze the law using 
any level of scrutiny, determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to use 
in such cases remains open for another court. 
 
251. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958, 958–59 (2011); United 
States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Gould, supra note 92, at 1562–64. 
252. Compare United States v. Lewis, 50 V.I. 995, 1000–01 (2008) (stating that “Heller 
unambiguously forecloses a Second Amendment challenge to that offense under any level of 
scrutiny”), with Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (noting “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny 
that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most 
preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,’ 
would fail constitutional muster” (internal citations omitted)). 
253. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *14 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 17, 2011). 
254. See id. at *5–9. 
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1.   Strict Scrutiny 
Employing strict scrutiny in considering whether the existing school 
zone laws violate the Second Amendment protection of an individual’s 
right to bear arms requires, first, an analysis of whether the government 
has a “compelling interest” to support the enactment of the laws.255  A 
compelling interest requires the government to show it had “an 
extremely important reason” for enacting the law.256  Second, the law in 
question must be examined as to whether it is “narrowly tailored” to 
serve that interest.257  This requires a law to be so limited that it neither 
restricts a constitutional right unrelated to advancing the government 
interest, nor omits restrictions on rights related to that interest.258  Strict 
scrutiny is often seen as “fatal” to any law that implicates a 
constitutional right deserving of its protection,259 and its application to 
most gun-control laws would likely produce a similar result. 
As evidenced by the records available when the school zone laws 
were passed, the laws were driven by a desire to protect children and 
other innocent residents from violence and even death.260  In addition to 
protecting the physical well-being of students and staff, measures taken 
to prevent violence on school campuses can prevent a negative 
educational environment.261  Furthermore, laws governing criminal 
activity and education have traditionally been viewed as the 
responsibility of the states.262  This likely would support the states’ ability 
to demonstrate a compelling interest in exercising their police powers in 
the enactment of school zone legislation. 
Yet, although such gun-control laws might be shown to serve a 
 
255. See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 103, at 85–86. 
256. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 694–95. 
257. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 691, 727. 
258. See Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232 (1987). 
259. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 671; Winkler, supra note 34, at 727. 
260. See 87th GEN. ASSEMB., H.R. TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 143, 145 (Ill. June 18, 
1992) (statement of Rep. Laurino); 136 CONG. REC. 1165 (1990) (statement of Sen. Herb 
Kohl). 
261. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS & BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2010, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter INDICATORS OF 
SCHOOL CRIME & SAFETY] (stating that victimized children “[i]n addition to experiencing 
loneliness, depression, and adjustment difficulties . . . are more prone to truancy, poor 
academic performance, dropping out of school, and violent behaviors” and that, “[f]or 
teachers, incidents of victimization may lead to professional disenchantment and even 
departure from the profession altogether” (citations omitted)). 
262. See Chamberlin, supra note 28, at 306. 
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compelling government interest, many would likely fail to survive the 
second prong in the analysis requiring that they be narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.  Demonstrating the efficacy of gun-control laws, 
necessary to support an argument of narrow tailoring, is difficult.263  
Indeed, as many commentators have pointed out, in recent years the 
District of Columbia had one of the worst homicide rates in the country 
despite also having one of the most restrictive gun-control laws.264  Gun-
rights proponents argue that a further distribution of weaponry among 
law-abiding citizens in the country also might serve to reduce gun 
violence against innocent people, not increase it.265  This viewpoint has 
been disputed, however.266 
Moreover, although homicides of youths between five and eighteen 
years of age and serious violent incidents against students who are 
twelve through eighteen years of age have declined at schools since 
1992, so have homicides and violent incidents off of school grounds.267  
And there is no indication that the states that instituted the 1000-foot 
gun-free perimeters have been any more effective in reducing violent 
school incidents than other states.268  Thus, not only have other states 
determined that they can achieve the goal of reducing school violence 
through less restrictive means than establishing gun-free zones outside 
of their schools in which otherwise law-abiding citizens could not carry 
loaded firearms, they have not experienced any worse results than the 
 
263. See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 103, at 86. 
264. Id. at 105 (noting that a study comparing the District of Columbia to forty-nine 
other major cities found the District’s homicide rate was “substantially higher” than the rates 
for the other cities after the 1976 handgun ordinance was passed). 
265. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND 
GUN CONTROL LAWS 323–24 (3d ed. 2010); Kopel, supra note 95, at 536–46; Rosenthal & 
Malcolm, supra note 103, at 105–06.  Following the killing of an assistant principal and 
wounding of a principal by a student, a Nebraska lawmaker introduced a bill that would allow 
teachers to carry concealed guns in schools.  See Khadaroo, supra note 197.  Similar proposals 
in Arizona, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin were unsuccessful.  Id. 
266. See, e.g., Charles C. Branas et al., Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession 
and Gun Assault, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2034, 2037 (2009) (finding in a Philadelphia-based 
study that individuals who carried guns were more likely to be deliberately shot by someone 
else than those who did not carry guns). 
267. See INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME & SAFETY, supra note 261, at 88 tbl.1.1, 90 
tbl.2.1. 
268. See id. at 97 tbl.4.2.  Although Wisconsin high school students reported being 
subject to fewer violent incidents and threats of violence than the national average in 2009, 
the percentage of Wisconsin students who reported being subject to such incidents or threats 
rose between 2003 and 2009 while the national average dropped.  Id. at 90 tbl.2.1, 97 tbl.4.2. 
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states that have established such perimeters.269 
In addition to the challenges to their efficacy, the school zone laws 
likely would face arguments that they are overinclusive in their effect on 
an individual’s right to self-defense in public places.  By granting only a 
few exceptions, the laws could be shown to inconvenience and even 
infringe upon the rights of those who wish to carry firearms in public for 
protection.270  This right is not to be taken lightly.  For example, a lawsuit 
filed in New Jersey featured plaintiffs seeking to possess firearms for 
self-defense, including a store owner who alleged he was mistakenly 
kidnapped and subsequently threatened by members of the Hell’s 
Angels motorcycle gang271 and a civilian employee of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations who was warned of a threat from members of 
an Islamic fundamentalist group.272 
Given these problems with the effectiveness and overinclusiveness of 
the school zone laws, proponents of the gun-free school zones, 
therefore, are likely to encounter problems in showing that the laws are 
narrowly tailored enough to meet the requirements of a strict scrutiny 
standard of review. 
But strict scrutiny is not necessarily the standard of review that will 
be employed by courts in evaluating challenged laws.  The Fifth Circuit 
in United States v. Emerson, for example, used a test more akin to a 
“reasonable basis” test than strict scrutiny.273  Despite finding an 
individual right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment, 
the court upheld a federal law prohibiting anyone under a restraining 
order from possessing a firearm.274  Indeed, even when courts profess to 
employ strict scrutiny, they may in fact be relying on a lesser standard 
than is commonly understood to protect fundamental constitutional 
rights.275  Therefore, it is necessary to explore how the laws would stack 
 
269. See id. at 97 tbl.4.2. 
270. See supra notes 192–96.  The only exceptions to the Illinois and California school 
zone laws are for certain exceptional circumstances such as for law enforcement officers and 
people who have been specifically allowed by schools to carry firearms or for certain 
enumerated circumstances.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(2)–(3) (West 2010).  Neither exempts widely permitted 
carriers.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(2)–(3). 
271. See Complaint for Deprivation of Civil Rights Under Color of Law at 6–8, Muller v. 
Maenza, No. 2:10-cv-06110-WHW-CCC (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2010). 
272. See id. at 8–9. 
273. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 691. 
274. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001). 
275. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 728–30 (evaluating cases where courts, in applying 
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up against the other standards of review such as intermediate scrutiny 
and rational-basis tests. 
2.   Intermediate Scrutiny 
In applying intermediate scrutiny to examine the school zone laws in 
California and Illinois, a court would examine whether the laws are 
“substantially related to an important governmental objective.”276  As 
already discussed, the important government objective likely to be 
advanced in defense of the laws would be protecting the states’ 
citizens—and, specifically, innocent children who are mandated to 
attend schools for a certain number of years—from gun violence.277  This 
is well within a state’s interests, which include providing a public 
education as well as deterring and preventing criminal activity against its 
citizens.278 
The question of whether the laws are “substantially related” to this 
mission is a less stringent standard than strict scrutiny’s “narrowly 
tailored” requirement.279  Thus, questions of the challenged laws’ 
efficacy, which can demonstrate or disprove that the laws have been 
narrowly tailored to achieve a solution, are not likely to play as 
important a role as they would in an inquiry employing strict scrutiny.  
Instead, a court probably would look to evidence that the government 
could present to show that the law forbidding individuals from carrying 
loaded firearms within 1000 feet of schools is substantially related to its 
interest in protecting school children and other people on school 
campuses from being violently injured or killed.  Indeed, this interest 
was cited by the California district court that dismissed the challenge to 
that state’s school zone law.280 
As would also probably occur in a less-deferential strict scrutiny 
review, there might be some debate about whether such a perimeter is 
necessary, given that many other states simply forbid the possession of 
weapons on school grounds, and whether there is a reason for setting 
1000 feet as the limit instead of 500 or 2000 feet.  But a court is likely to 
defer to the government’s judgment that the zone is necessary for 
 
strict scrutiny to gun-control laws, have possibly watered down the standard). 
276. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
277. See supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text. 
278. See Chamberlin, supra note 28, at 306–08. 
279. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 671; Winkler, supra note 34, at 691. 
280. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *14 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 17, 2011). 
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protection and substantially related to its well-established interest in 
preventing violence against minors.281  Therefore, it is probable that the 
laws could survive a review based on intermediate scrutiny.282 
3.   Reasonable or Rational Basis 
Lastly, even though Justice Scalia rejected application of a rational-
basis test in his majority opinion for the Heller case,283 a court still might 
apply such a test—albeit under a different name.284  Indeed, the Fourth 
Circuit accused other courts that treated the Heller dicta as a “safe 
harbor” for certain laws as engaging in a type of rational-basis review.285  
Professor Adam Winkler also points out that the Fifth Circuit in United 
States v. Emerson, while seemingly applying a sort of strict scrutiny test 
in calling for “narrowly tailored” exceptions to a Second Amendment 
right, ended up permitting “reasonable” restrictions and a much lower 
standard level of review.286 
A rational-basis test under any name would call for a court to simply 
analyze whether a law is justified by advancing a “legitimate state 
interest.”287  Undoubtedly, a court easily could be persuaded that the 
government has a legitimate interest in protecting school children and 
others on school campuses from the potential dangers posed by loaded 
firearms.288  That such firearms can be discharged from 1000 feet away 
and injure a child or another person on school property could be found 
to justify the government’s imposition of such a gun-free zone around 
schools.289 
 
281. See id. 
282. But see Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1318–19  (M.D. Ga. 
2011) (finding it unclear whether the government’s interest in preventing crime is 
substantially related to a law that prohibits the possession of firearms in church under an 
intermediate scrutiny approach). 
283. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008). 
284. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 690–91 (noting a court decision that mixed the 
language of strict scrutiny with that of reasonableness review). 
285. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2010). 
286. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 690–91. 
287. See id. at 700. 
288. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *14 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (“The government’s stated interest, of preventing harm to children, is 
well-established as more than an important governmental objective.  As the Supreme Court 
has observed, ‘It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in 
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling.’” (quoting 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (internal citation omitted))). 
289. According to the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, some bullets can travel up 
 
HETZNER-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2011  1:17 PM 
2011] WHERE ANGELS TREAD 401 
Alternatively, a court could evaluate the law under a slightly more 
rigorous “reasonable regulation test,” which asks “whether the 
challenged law is a reasonable method of regulating a right to bear 
arms.”290  This type of test traditionally has been used by state courts to 
evaluate laws challenged as violating the right to bear arms guaranteed 
in most state constitutions.291  In addition to asking whether the school 
zone laws serve a legitimate government interest, this test asks whether 
the regulations the laws impose are reasonable.292  This is still an 
extremely deferential test,293 and the school zone laws likely would be 
upheld as reasonable because they have some exceptions such as 
allowing weapons on one’s own property or allowing weapons to be 
carried, unloaded, and encased.  These exceptions allow a person to 
possess a firearm, just not in a readily usable capacity on public property 
near a school.294  Although Justice Scalia had concerns about such a 
situation when a firearm is kept for self-defense in the home,295 carrying 
a loaded weapon near a school is another matter altogether. 
In sum, it is likely that even if a court were to find that Heller and 
McDonald established an individual right for a person to carry a loaded 
handgun in close proximity to a school, the only way that a school zone 
law would not be held valid would be under a faithful strict scrutiny 
approach.  Thus, although most courts likely would uphold the laws 
against legal challenges, the possibility exists that the laws could be 
overturned by future courts. 
V.  SUGGESTED CHANGES TO GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONE LAWS 
Even though the school zone laws are likely to be struck down only 
by a court using the highest standard of protection for a constitutional 
right, legislators still should consider changes to their statutes.  In the 
years since the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act was passed, many 
states have scaled back the law’s application without adverse effect 
 
to five miles.  Firearms: Distances Bullets Travel, TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE, 
http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/learning/hunter_education/homestudy/firearms/bullets.phtml (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2011). 
290. Winkler, supra note 34, at 717. 
291. See id. at 716–17. 
292. See id. at 717. 
293. See id. at 718. 
294. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *14 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 17, 2011). 
295. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). 
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through expansion of the numbers of people legally allowed to carry 
firearms.296  In most states, holders of valid permits are now allowed to 
carry their weapons near, and sometimes even on, school grounds 
without risk of penalty.297  In 2010, Louisiana amended its school zone 
law to allow individuals with valid permits to carry concealed firearms 
near schools, although not on school grounds.298  The legislator who 
sponsored the change argued it was necessary to allow gun owners to 
carry their weapons while walking their dogs near schools or, for 
residents who lived within 1000 feet of schools, from their homes to 
their vehicles.299  Wisconsin enacted a similar change as part of a larger 
bill passed in 2011 that established a licensing system under which 
residents could legally carry concealed firearms,300 and thus the change 
that eliminated the 1000-foot zones around schools did not get much 
attention in the debate.  Changing the state’s school zone law was 
critical to gun advocates like Wisconsin Carry, however, which 
advocated for a version of a concealed carry law most likely to limit the 
importance of school zones.301 
Significantly, even though state laws have neutered the federal 
school zone law to a certain extent, a provision penalizing the discharge 
of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school still threatens punishment for 
gun carriers whether licensed or not.302  That provision makes it unlawful 
for a person to, “knowingly or with reckless disregard for the safety of 
another,” discharge or attempt to discharge a firearm in a place that he 
knows is a school zone.303  Exceptions are limited to people on private 
property within the school zone, participants in certain school-
sanctioned activities, people who have received authorization from 
school authorities, and law-enforcement officers acting in their official 
 
296. Violent crimes against students in schools have fallen in recent years nationwide, 
even with the passage of more permissive gun laws.  See INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME & 
SAFETY, supra note 261, at 90 tbl.2.1; State Firearms Laws Are Taking A Radical, Dangerous 
Turn, supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
297. See Kopel, supra note 95, at 519–21; State Firearms Laws Are Taking a Radical, 
Dangerous Turn, supra note 29. 
298. See Anderson & Moller, supra note 201. 
299. See id. 
300. See Stein, supra note 201. 
301. See Gitte Laasby, Chief Slams Firearm Measure, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 3, 
2011, at A1; Wisconsin Carry Urges Support of SB-93 As Amended, WISCONSIN CARRY, INC. 
(May 24, 2011), http://www.wisconsincarry.org/default.html. 
302. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 § 1702(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(3)(A) 
(2006). 
303. Id. 
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capacities.304  Unfortunately, the federal law includes the requirement 
that the violator knows (or have reasonable cause to believe) that he is 
in a school zone,305 an element that has caused problems for prosecutors 
enforcing similar laws. 
Although his case was not part of the lawsuit brought by Wisconsin 
Carry in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
that challenged the state’s school zone law, twenty-three-year-old 
Sheboygan Falls, Wisconsin resident Matthew Hubing’s experience 
illustrates some of the reasons why legislators should eliminate the 
knowledge aspect of the school zone laws.  Hubing was arrested in May 
2010, after he had strapped an unloaded rifle to his shoulder, holstered a 
loaded handgun on his hip, mounted his bicycle, and pedaled to a 
friend’s house.306  On his way home, he was questioned by police, 
eventually jailed for sixteen days, and charged with violating 
Wisconsin’s school zone law.307  The charges were later dismissed by a 
Sheboygan County circuit court judge.308  The first time the judge 
dismissed the charges it was because Hubing was able to show that he 
had been on private property and, therefore, was exempt from 
prosecution under the law.309  Hubing was later recharged, but the judge 
again dismissed the charges by ruling that prosecutors could not show 
Hubing knew he had transgressed into the school zone.310  The cops’ 
measurement put Hubing forty-six feet inside the 1000-foot perimeter 
surrounding the school near his home; whereas Hubing’s calculation put 
him outside of the zone.311  Both gun-rights advocates and a local district 
attorney later said Hubing’s case exposed failings in the Wisconsin 
law.312  But, while the district attorney focused on the limitations the law 
posed for enforcement, the gun-rights advocate complained about its 
potential implications for gun owners.313  Nik Clark, president of 
Wisconsin Carry, Inc., stated as follows: “That’s 46 feet between a 
felony or not?  That’s ridiculous.  Are we going to send police with laser 
 
304. Id. § 922(q)(3)(B). 
305. Id. § 922(q)(2)(A). 
306. See Vielmetti, supra note 29; Personal Account of Matthew Hubing, supra note 29. 
307. See Personal Account of Matthew Hubing, supra note 29. 
308. See Vielmetti, supra note 29. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. See id. 
313. See id. 
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measuring devices every time?”314 
Other alterations should be made to school zone laws—in addition 
to removing the knowledge element from the California and federal 
laws315—to bring them into conformance with the emerging Second 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Despite the school zone laws’ success thus 
far in withstanding legal assault, lawmakers should consider changes to 
the laws in the interest of preserving the core protections of such 
statutes and avoiding what could lead to protracted court battles.  
Although politicians had important reasons for introducing the idea of 
gun-free school zones in the early 1990s,316 the experience of the 
majority of the states suggests that more modest measures can be as 
effective in addressing the public’s concerns over school violence.317  
Indeed, as has been noted by others, some of the exceptions to the 
existing gun-free school zone statutes have essentially rendered the 
statutes useless in some areas.  The federal government’s allowance for 
individuals legally permitted to carry loaded weapons within the zones 
has made having such zones nearly meaningless in most states.318  The 
requirement under both California and federal law of a knowing (or a 
reason to believe) violation before a penalty is invoked makes those 
statutes difficult to enforce.  In addition, some states that want to allow 
more citizens to legally carry firearms may have unwittingly expanded 
the group of potential violators who could be nabbed for an 
unpermitted transgression into a federal gun-free school zone and 
charged with a felony.319  The politicians who favored these permissive 
changes to the gun laws likely would endorse a different approach. 
Those interested in strengthening the nation’s gun law should 
consider changes to the school zone laws as well.  Not only are the 
school zone laws difficult to enforce because of the requirement that an 
individual know he is in a school zone,320 the laws’ effectiveness is 
becoming more and more hampered by the large number of states that 
 
314. Id. 
315. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 § 1702(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(3)(A) 
(2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(b) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011). 
316. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 1 (detailing schoolyard shootings that alarmed 
lawmakers). 
317. See supra notes 267–69, 296–98 and accompanying text. 
318. See Kopel, supra note 95, at 518–19 (calling the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act 
“irrelevant”); supra notes 206, 296–301. 
319. See supra note 29. 
320. See, e.g., Vielmetti, supra note 29. 
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now allow residents to carry concealed firearms.321 
A compromise between those who want to allow citizens to carry 
firearms in public for self-defense and those who want to protect 
schoolchildren from the threat of violence posed by the public 
possession of readily usable weapons, therefore, is in order.  Such a 
compromise can be reached by replacing the current school zone laws 
with ones that make it unlawful only to fire a weapon or attempt to fire 
a weapon within a 1000-foot radius of a school.322  This would address 
the greatest fear prompting such laws—that a firearm shot near a school 
might harm a child or another person associated with that school—while 
not implicating a person’s ability to carry or display such a weapon in a 
lawful manner.  As noted, the federal school zone law already has such a 
provision in place, albeit with the requirement that the person knows he 
is in a school zone,323 which has limited the effectiveness of the state 
school zone laws.324 
A better law would be one that eliminates the requirement that a 
person know he is within a school zone when he fires a weapon.  In such 
a case, the person who fires the gun can be held criminally liable even 
without knowing, or reasonably knowing, that he is within 1000 feet of a 
school.  An exception should exist, as it does in the federal statute, for 
when the person is on private property or has another reasonable 
justification.325  Such limited circumstances should be enough to protect 
an individual’s constitutional right to self-defense at home, without 
implicating the rights of innocent others.  In addition, the self-defense 
argument also would be available to rebut charges in court for those 
who fire or attempt to fire a weapon on public property within the 1000-
foot zone.326  Because lack of knowledge would not be a defense for 
 
321. See Stein, supra note 201 (noting that Wisconsin became the forty-ninth state in 
July 2011 to allow citizens to carry concealed guns).  After Wisconsin’s law was enacted, 
Illinois became the only state to not permit the carrying of concealed weapons.  See id. 
322. Maine penalizes the discharge, but not the possession, of a firearm within 500 feet 
of a school and prohibits possession on public school property but does not prohibit 
possession within 500 feet of a school.  See ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6552 (2008).  
Minnesota makes it a crime to recklessly handle or intentionally point a firearm at another 
within 300 feet of a school.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 152.01(14a), 609.66 (West 2009 & Supp. 
2011).  The change in Wisconsin’s law left intact a provision that makes it a felony to 
discharge a firearm in a place that the person knows is within 1000 feet of a school.  See WIS. 
STAT. § 948.605(3) (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 35, §§ 91–96. 
323. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(3)(A) (2006). 
324. See id. § 922(q)(2)(A), (q)(3)(A). 
325. See id. § 922(q)(3)(B)(i)–(iv). 
326. A successful claim of self-defense requires a defendant to show he faced a “serious” 
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others who are firing their weapons in public places, the new law could 
have more teeth than what is currently in place with the federal and 
California laws. 
Although it could be argued that this change in the laws would tie 
law enforcement’s hands when it comes to questioning and restraining 
those with firearms who are near schools, the reality is that police are 
likely enforcing the law after receiving notice of a prior incident 
anyway.327  This would lead to little difference in how the law would be 
enforced under the proposed change. 
The new law would be well-positioned to withstand the scrutiny of 
most courts.  Even under a kind of heightened scrutiny, the new law’s 
focus on the firing of guns near school grounds where innocent children 
are likely to get hurt should convince a judge that the law has enough 
focus and purpose to withstand a legal challenge.  First, by restricting 
the provisions that penalize simple possession of a firearm to a school 
building or school grounds, the law clearly falls within Heller’s dicta that 
explicitly endorsed laws that ban firearm possession in schools and 
would be viewed as a narrow restriction tied to a significant government 
interest.328  Second, by allowing firearms to be carried within the school 
zone and only fired for certain limited exceptions, the law would still 
protect an individual’s ability to possess a weapon that could be used for 
a person’s self-defense in his home, which the Court found in Heller and 
McDonald to be the core guarantee of the Second Amendment.329 
Even in the current vitriolic political climate,330 such a measure 
 
and “imminent” threat of bodily harm and that this response was “necessary and 
proportionate” to the harm faced.  See V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2001). 
327. See, e.g., Vielmetti, supra note 29; Christine Won, Man: Police Did Not Like Him 
Openly Carrying, RACINE J. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.journaltimes.com/news/local/
article_cae54460-9f44-11de-8897-001cc4c03286.html; Personal Account of Matthew Hubing, 
supra note 29.  Police officers in Racine, Wisconsin, arrested Frank Hannan-Rock during 
their response to a call that a shot had been fired and a man was reloading his handgun in the 
street.  When officers encountered Hannan-Rock openly carrying a gun in a holster on his 
own front porch, Hannan-Rock refused to give them his name or address and was arrested.  
See Won, supra; Letter from Michael E. Nieskes, Dist. Att’y, Racine Cnty, to Frank Hannan-
Rock (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.wisconsincarry.org/pdf/GFSZA_Legal_Documents/Hannan-
Rock_Racine-Letters.pdf; Letter from Michael E. Nieskes, Dist. Att’y, Racine Cnty., to 
Frank Hannan-Rock (June 18, 2010), http://www.wisconsincarry.org/pdf/GFSZA_Legal_ 
Documents/Hannan-Rock_Racine-Letters.pdf. 
328. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
329. See id. at 628–29; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048 (2010). 
330. See Dan Balz, Debt Talks Show Breakdown in Governing, WASH. POST, July 24, 
2011, at A1 (calling the 2011 political climate a “period of partisanship as intense as it has 
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should garner broad support from politicians of different persuasions.  
Indeed, in a state as divided as Wisconsin was in 2011,331 several 
Democrats joined Republicans to support the passage of the law 
allowing the concealed carrying of firearms.332  The problem likely would 
lie in getting support from the gun lobby, which has successfully pushed 
for a nationwide easing of restrictions on gun possession for the past two 
decades.333  On the other hand, one of the gun lobby’s most successful 
arguments has been to distinguish the lawful possession of firearms from 
their criminal use.334  Limiting the school zone laws to the firing or 
attempted firing of weapons near school grounds, rather than the 
possession of firearms, might just pacify this powerful interest group. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
More than two decades after Laurie Dann and Patrick Purdy made 
victims of dozens of innocent people in Illinois and California, another 
lone gunman killed six people and wounded thirteen more in a 
supermarket parking lot in Tucson, Arizona.335  Among the dead on that 
day in January 2011 were a nine-year-old girl and a federal judge.336  
Among the wounded was a U.S. congresswoman.337  Public calls emerged 
anew after the Tucson shooting for increasing, and in some cases even 
restoring, firearm regulations.338  Equally compelling reasons drove 
school zone laws when they first were initiated in the early 1990s.339  But 
the Court’s recent decisions endorsing an individual right to bear arms 
 
been in many years”). 
331. See Monica Davey, Recall Elections in Sharply Divided Wisconsin Are Ending on 
Frenetic Note, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, at A11 (stating that Wisconsin is currently 
experiencing “one of the most polarized, vitriolic political years in memory”). 
332. See Jason Stein, Concealed Carry Bill Heads to Walker: Assembly Passes GOP Gun 
Plan with Bipartisan Support, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 22, 2011, at A1 (noting that 11 
Assembly Democrats voted for the bill that included changes to the state’s school zone law); 
Press Release, Office of Wis. State Sen. Lena C. Taylor, Statement on 
Conceal Carry Bill (June 9, 2011), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/sen04/news/Press/2011/pr2
011-029.asp. 
333. See State Firearms Laws Are Taking a Radical, Dangerous Turn, supra note 29. 
334. See Laasby, supra note 301; State Firearms Laws Are Taking a Radical, Dangerous 
Turn, supra note 29. 
335. See Marc Lacey & David M. Herszenhorn, Congresswoman Is Shot in Rampage 
near Tucson, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at 1. 
336. See id. 
337. See id. 
338. See, e.g., Editorial, Saner Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at WK9. 
339. See supra Parts I, IV.A. 
HETZNER-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2011  1:17 PM 
408 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:359 
should prompt states to consider changes to existing laws that prevent 
the carrying of loaded firearms within 1000 feet of school grounds.  
Although such laws could withstand most legal challenges, policymakers 
should pursue reforms to head off any problems while improving the 
laws in the process.  Such laws are especially vulnerable should the 
Court determine that the ability to carry a weapon for self-defense on 
public property near schools is a right guaranteed by the Constitution 
and that any law to the contrary must pass a strict scrutiny test.340 
The California and federal school zone laws also are currently 
hampered in their application by requiring knowledge on the part of 
armed individuals who enter the zones to be successfully prosecuted.341  
A change that allows prosecution of individuals who fire weapons within 
public places in these zones, without providing an exception for whether 
they knew of their presence within the zone, would likely serve many of 
the same goals of the original legislation while surviving even the closest 
look by the courts. 
Policymakers need to do what they can to try to ensure that what 
Laurie Dann and Patrick Purdy did will not occur again.  But lawmakers 
also need to evaluate the effectiveness of legislation passed in the 
emotion of a moment and adapt the laws to the evolving conception of 
the Second Amendment. 
AMY HETZNER* 
 
 
340. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
341. See Stein, supra note 201; Vielmetti, supra note 29. 
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